

Clientelism, Social Policy,
and the Quality of Democracy

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Partisan Linkages and Social Policy Delivery in Argentina and Chile

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Widespread democratization since the 1970s has generated a reassessment of the literature on party-voter linkages, with a special emphasis on whether distributive ties should be characterized as programmatic or clientelistic (see the introduction to this volume). As the delivery of private and public goods for electoral gain has become the subject of scholarly scrutiny, researchers have sought a better integration of the programmatic and clientelistic incentives that determine the strategies of parties and the behavior of voters.¹ The early literature on distributive politics saw programmatic and clientelistic parties as analytically and historically distinct. Consequently, scholars proposed competing theories to explain the electoral strategies of distinctly programmatic or clientelistic parties. Distinct theories, in turn, demanded different characterizations of programmatic and clientelistic voters.

Drawing heavily from Responsible Party models of U.S. politics, scholars characterized programmatic linkages as a policy tie where parties deliver public goods to ideologically committed voters. These voters relied on informational shortcuts (cues) to make voting decisions and develop policy expectations consistent with the electoral platforms of programmatic parties.² As it was eloquently described by Miller and Stokes:

Under a system of party government the voters' response to the local legislative candidates is based on the candidates' identification with party programs. These programs are the substance of their appeals to the constituency, which will act on the basis of its information about the proposals and legislative record of the parties. Since the party programs are of dominant importance, the candidates are deprived of any independent basis of support. They will not be able to build in their home districts an electoral redoubt from which to challenge the leadership of their parties.³

By contrast, a separate literature described clientelistic linkages in starkly different terms, explaining the non-programmatic distribution of particularistic benefits to a restricted menu of voters on sociohistorical grounds. As described by Kitschelt and Wilkinson:

In a clientelistic relationship, in contrast, the politician's delivery of a good is *contingent upon* the actions of specific members of the electorate. . . . What makes clientelistic exchange distinctive is not simply the fact that the benefits are targeted. Rather, it is the fact that politicians target the benefits *only* to individuals or identifiable small groups who have already delivered or who promise to deliver their electoral support to the partisan benefactor."⁴

The publication of Cox and McCubbins's *Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game*⁵ began to bridge the gulf between the clientelistic and programmatic party literatures. For the next twenty years, an increasing number of scholars recognized the programmatic and non-programmatic behavior of parties as complementary strategies.⁶ Rather than a distinguishing trait of party systems, programmatic and non-programmatic distributive incentives became theoretically and empirically intertwined. However, we have yet to see an equally integrated model that explains the distributive preferences of voters.

In this chapter we fill this gap in the literature, showing that voters develop programmatic and non-programmatic expectations in regard to the delivery of private, club, and public goods. We demonstrate the distinct role of partisan networks and ideological attachments to explain the distributive expectations of voters by emphasizing how access to publicly provided benefits shapes voters' distributive expectations.

We argue that, just as parties offer voters a portfolio of benefits that include programmatic policies and non-programmatic goods, voters develop distributive expectations in regard to the delivery of public policies and goods. We describe distinct mechanisms that explain the programmatic and non-programmatic components of voters' attitudes. We provide evidence that clientelistic linkages are mediated by partisan networks that screen *deserving* voters. By contrast, programmatic linkages result from ideological attachments that may be orthogonal to partisan distribution networks.

To support our argument, we center our empirical analyses on two well-known case studies: Argentina and Chile. While researchers tend to characterize Chilean parties as programmatic and Argentine parties as clientelistic, this chapter shows that voters in these countries have distributive expectations that include both determinants of distributive expectations. Finally, we explain how partisan networks and ideological affinity differ in voters of both countries.

First, we describe the formation of party-voter linkages in Latin America, which are characterized by partisan networks that connect voters to party members as well as by policy affinity traits. In the following section, we explain how these existing partisan linkages shape the distributive expectations of voters in Latin America. We then analyze party-voter linkages in Argentina and Chile and conclude by discussing the policy implications of our analysis.

Partisan Linkages and Social Policy Delivery in the New Latin American Democracies

The literature on Latin American political parties has always emphasized their non-ideological character and weak institutionalization.⁷ After the return of democracy and its coincidence with dramatic shifts in models of economic development, recent contributions have focused on the increasing reliance of Latin American political parties on clientelism and patronage for electoral gain. Throughout the 1990s, the combination of intense electoral competition and tighter fiscal environments made political parties increasingly dependent on the distribution of handouts—clientelism—and public jobs—patronage. According to this literature, the convergence toward market reforms in the 1990s limited the ability of political parties to legislate more universal redistributive policies, thereby increasing the pressure to deliver private goods to particular constituencies in order to muster political support.⁸ In a context of state retrenchment, populist parties became ever more reliant on the access and distribution of particularistic benefits.

The expanding literature on clientelism in the region has benefited from an emphasis on the strategies of political parties and governments in using private goods distribution to foster political support. This literature provides important insights on the design of programs,⁹ the portfolio of goods being distributed,¹⁰ the shift from programmatic to clientelistic strategies,¹¹ the impact of differential access to fiscal resources,¹² and the mobilization strategies that underlie the choice of different targets of distribution.¹³ Our research, by contrast, focuses on the demand side by looking at voters' distributive expectations and how they are shaped by prior experiences in the distribution of publicly financed benefits. In so doing, we assume that voter-party linkages are not spot exchanges of vote buying as described in Stokes,¹⁴ but based on longer-term interactions with political organizations and public officials. These interactions shape voters' perceptions in regard to the political venues to access publicly funded benefits and their assessment of political parties.

In our view, voters are self-interested social actors, embedded in a complex web of political networks, who update their preferences based on information about the

likelihood of receiving public and private benefits from parties. We distinguish *distributive preferences* from *distributive expectations*, with *preferences* being explained by voters' social and economic traits such as income, education, or skills, and *expectations* being explained by the perceived likelihood that parties will deliver goods and the mechanism shaping their *access* to such benefits. Such expectations, we argue, have a crucial role in defining voters' electoral behavior and thereby the programmatic and non-programmatic linkages connecting voters to parties.

Whereas most of the prior literature on voter-party linkages has focused on the delivery of different types of goods—public or private—for distinguishing programmatic from clientelistic parties, our classification probes the question of how voters *access* benefits. For example, while conditional cash transfers are now prominent in much of Latin America,⁵ access to benefits could result from voters being proximate to party brokers or from bureaucratically defined rules that identify a target population. Access to unemployment insurance could be mediated by party brokers in one country and by bureaucratic agencies in another. Public sector posts could be filled by open searches under civil service rules or at the discretion of senior party figures. In other words, the same public or private goods may serve diverse political goals in different political environments depending on how policy access is defined in the letter of the law and, more importantly, in its implementation.

Differences in the role of party organizations for delivering publicly funded resources, in turn, are shaped by institutional constraints on policy implementation. This distinction is crucial to assess, whether or not the distributive expectations of voters are associated with specific delivery mechanisms. Consequently, while we do not ignore differences in the excludability of goods, our focus is on whether policies are implemented in a manner in which benefits depend on a voter's proximity to party members or are independent of such a connection.

Voters' Distributive Expectations and Political Linkages

Voters' distributive expectations result from their prior interactions with political networks, as described in the ethnographic literature,¹⁶ and from retrospective assessments of policy implementation that determine eligibility to publicly provided benefits. Consequently, party-voter linkages vary both across countries (depending on institutional constraints on policy implementation) and across parties (depending on organizational capacity to deliver benefits through networks or to credibly commit to programmatic redistribution using ideological cues).

Based on prior distributive experiences, voters assign importance or weight to their connections to members of different parties as a critical mechanism for ac-

cessing benefits. Voters also assign varying levels of significance to their ideological distance from candidates of different parties. Consequently, voter-specific distributive expectations result from the relative proximity of voters to partisan networks and their relative policy distance. Consequently, whereas preferences for redistribution may be explained by socioeconomic traits such as income, class, or education, partisan networks and policy positioning play a key role in shaping the distributive expectations of voters.

We assume that voters perceive political parties as providers of benefits that are independently delivered through public policy and partisan networks. Differences in the import voters attach to each of these mechanisms in accessing publicly funded goods, we argue, allows us to distinguish between programmatic and clientelistic linkages. The emphasis on access to excludable private goods is of critical importance since the same benefit can be delivered through general criteria (either universal or group-based) or through personal connections between voters and members of parties. However, the weight that voters attach to their proximity to party members and/or their ideological affinity to platforms varies greatly, given that voters neither share the same connection to all parties nor obtain identical returns from clientelistic or programmatic distribution.

The distributive expectations of voters are characterized by three main components. First, voters have different tastes for distribution, which are largely explained by socioeconomic traits that determine the marginal value of the benefit received. A second component is the weight that individual voters attach to the probability of receiving benefits based on their ideological proximity to parties—independent of party membership. In this case, targeted distribution is the result of policies that voters perceive as beneficial to their group category. Finally, the third component is the importance that each individual voter attaches to his or her connection to party members in developing expectations for accessing benefits conditional on patterns of policy implementation that allow parties discretion in the delivery of publicly provided benefits.

It is important to note that proximity to party members is not simply need-based. Even if a voter is eager to receive goods from a party, he or she may be far removed from party members that are in position to provide access to those goods. Additionally, in contrast to ideological affinity, connection to political networks is a function of the size of an individual's personal network, of each party's organizational capacity, and of the ties that connect voters to members of each party. Because networks evolve slowly over time and require considerable effort to absorb new entrants, voters may more easily take on new ideological or programmatic positions than expand the number of ties to party members within a political network. Hence, in

weighing parties' distributive promises, voters internalize the impact of institutional and organizational constraints that shape the delivery of publicly funded benefits.

Voters' distributive expectations depend on the additive combination of goods delivered, through ideological and network proximity, by parties who control different agencies and levels of government and by differences in labor market conditions (e.g., income, education, skills, etc.). Voters with similar distributive preferences and skills can still draw different benefits from these partisan networks. Whereas a low-skilled worker would perceive significant benefits from receiving a public sector job, access to such job depends critically on his or her proximity to party members in a position to deliver employment. By contrast, citizens are likely to benefit from more progressive tax policies, regardless of their connections to party members.

Voters' perceptions of the distributive benefits of partisan networks, in turn, are shaped by the organizational capacity of parties to deliver excludable goods as well as by institutional constraints on their ability to access public resources and utilize partisan networks for distribution. Subject to clearly differentiable budget constraints, not all parties will be in the same position to provide voters with equivalent combinations of goods delivered through networks and through nondiscretionary criteria. Because political parties face budgetary constraints related to the access and distribution of excludable benefits, the supply of clientelistic resources affects parties differently and is independent from programmatic decisions to implement general redistributive policies. Therefore, whereas political parties with dense organizational networks can choose between clientelistic and programmatic linkages, those lacking such networks are restricted to the latter.

Voters' experiences with each mechanism for accessing benefits shape the nature of their linkages to parties. If they perceive networks as the crucial means for accessing benefits, they will place more value on their proximity to party members in forming their distributive expectations. By contrast, if electoral platforms cue voters to policies that parties will likely implement, voters may rely on ideological proximity when defining their distributive expectations. Whereas the former process will foster clientelistic linkages between parties and voters, the latter will contribute to building programmatic linkages associated to ideological cues. In short, because political systems vary in terms of the institutional constraints they impose on the partisan distribution of excludable goods, and parties differ in organizational capacity to access and deliver resources, we expect variation in party-voter linkages across and within countries. In the following section we use this framework to explain variation in the distributive expectations of Argentine and Chilean voters, which in turn shapes the different types of linkages we observe in those countries.

Clientelistic and Programmatic Views of Partisan Politics in Argentina and Chile

Current research considers Chile and Argentina as characterized predominantly by distinct programmatic and clientelistic parties, respectively.¹⁷ Similar on many factors theorized to affect voter-party linkages, both countries have democratized recently—Argentina in 1983 and Chile 1990—and have well-established mass parties that rely on clearly identifiable party labels and on their power over candidate nominations.¹⁸ Both countries have a presidential executive, multiparty environments, similar levels of economic development, and ethnic, religious, and cultural legacies.

The party systems that emerged after their transitions to democracy were based on political parties and coalitions already in place prior to the repressive military regimes that ruled each country. However, current research views the Argentine party system as characterized by non-ideological and patronage-prone catchall parties: the Peronists (Partido Justicialista, or PJ) and the Radicals (Unión Cívica Radical, or UCR).¹⁹ The two main parties have alternated in the Executive since the return of democracy in 1983. The Radicals won the 1983 and the 1999 presidential elections (the latter in a coalition with a center-left party), and the Peronists won the 1989, 1995, 2003, and 2007 elections. However, unified government—when the party of the president also controls both chambers of Congress—has only occurred under some Peronist presidents, because the Radicals have never been able to win control of the Senate. Moreover, Argentina is a federal country, and the Peronists have controlled a majority of governorships and municipalities since the return of democracy, thereby gaining more access to fiscal resources for distribution because most social policies are implemented at the provincial or municipal level.²⁰

In spite of proportional representation (PR), electoral rules enacted by authoritarian rulers to minimize the electoral might of Peronists, most votes in Argentina concentrated in very few parties since democratization. The sum of the vote of the two main parties, the PJ and the UCR, ranged from 88.5% in 1983 to 67.6% in 1995.²¹ In 1997, the electoral growth of a center-left party called FREPASO (Front for a Country in Solidarity) brought the Radicals to join it in an electoral coalition to win the 1999 presidential election. The collapse of a UCR-led coalition government in 2001, however, led to a substantive growth in electoral volatility, as both the UCR and the FREPASO were shunned by voters, thus reestablishing the historical dominance of the Peronists.²² As the UCR struggled to produce credible presidential candidates, new parties emerged in an attempt to attract the non-Peronist vote. However, the UCR remains the most significant alternative to the PJ at the provincial level.

In contrast to Argentina's party system, the Chilean parties have historically been described as programmatic.²³ Before the 1973 military coup, the polity was divided into three ideological blocs (the right, the center, and the left). In 1988, two electoral coalitions of clear ideological orientation emerged during the campaign for a plebiscite on the transition to democracy. The electoral stability of these two coalitions has been reinforced since the transition to democracy by its binomial electoral system. This electoral system requires the winner to double the votes of the runner up to gain the two seats assigned to the district.²⁴ It thus generates an overrepresentation of the loser and favors the election of one legislator from each of the two main electoral coalitions that dominated Chilean politics since the transition to democracy. The center-left coalition is called *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (Coalition of Parties for Democracy) and includes three main parties: Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy) and includes three main parties: the Socialist Party (PS), the Christian Democratic Party (DC), and the Party for Democracy (PPD)—which split from the Socialist Party—along with other minor political parties. The Concertación won four successive presidential elections and held the executive seat between 1990 and 2010. During this period, it had the majority in the lower chamber and gained control of the Senate after a constitutional reform removed the nonelected senators established by the outgoing military regime in 2005.

The center-right coalition is called *Alianza por Chile* (Alliance for Chile) and includes two parties: the National Renovation (RN), which is the heir of the traditional conservative party, and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI), which was founded by personnel of the military regime.²⁵ With the exception of the 2005 election, RN and UDI have always coordinated their presidential candidates and legislative electoral campaigns because the binomial electoral system favors the representation of a legislator from each coalition in a majority of districts. This coalition won the 2009 presidential election and currently holds the Presidency.

In addition to the differences between party system and the political organization—federal in Argentina and unitary in Chile—there is crucial variation in institutional constraints on the delivery of social policy that further shape the perceptions of voters about the importance of ideology and networks in guiding their distributive expectations. Chilean parties face tighter regulation and greater difficulties than their Argentine counterparts in allocating publicly funded goods through their political networks. Whereas in Argentina the resources of social programs are allocated to voters through political networks, in Chile, social policy distribution is conducted by bureaucratic agencies.²⁶ Differences in the role of networks imply that two welfare programs with similar designs on paper, such as *Chile Solidario* in Chile and *Jefes y Jefas de Hogar* in Argentina, both of which are implemented and administered at the municipal level, have very different delivery practices. We as-

sume these different procedures reinforce perceptions about the role of networks in access to publicly provided benefits only in Argentina.

In addition to social policy, the Argentine public sector is more politicized than is the Chilean one.²⁷ Party brokers depend on patronage to sustain their political machines,²⁸ and public employees are required to engage in political activities—especially the large number of temporary employees appointed by current mayors without guaranteed tenure.²⁹ Hence, public sector jobs in Argentina are dependent on political contacts, thereby shaping voters' perceptions that the likelihood of obtaining a public sector job is related to their connection to party organizations and especially with active political participation.³⁰ By contrast, the several civil service reforms reduced the capacity of Chilean parties to use patronage for sustaining their organizations, while the system of party quotas within the governing coalition reduced the discretion of any one party in appointments.³¹ Civil service rules, thus, should make voters perceive that access to public sector jobs is less likely to be mediated by networks in Chile than in Argentina.³² An advisor to Socialist President Michelle Bachelet explained this policy in a personal interview with the authors:

[Patronage] is a survival strategy that brings [political] bread today and [political] hunger tomorrow. President [Bachelet] in current surveys has an honesty index of 91%. There are more people in Chile that think that the president is honest than people that think their grandmother is honest. And that gives you great political benefits, much more than to hire your cousin, nephew, brother-in-law. If the crooks knew how good a business is to be honest, they would be honest just because of how crooked they are.³³

As a result, Chilean politicians rely more on privately financed goods and services to persuade voters. As described by a PPD representative who is also a doctor:

We go and provide medical services to people: "Please, come in, let me know what hurts." And we have a system of pharmacies that gives them medicine. I buy the medicine, or friends who are doctors give them to me. And the veterinarians take the parasites out of pets, the lawyers provide legal advice, and teachers play with the kids, they paint their faces, and a guy from the radio provides entertainment and karaoke. All of it on Saturday morning in my headquarters.³⁴

Similarly, a UDI representative described his work with constituents in the following way:

We made a law . . . at the proposal of UDI representatives, that allows the sale or gift of glasses for farsightedness without a medical prescription as a transitory

solution . . . we adopted this program that allows us to have daily contact, almost the obligation to be in permanent contact with the voter . . . [and we deliver the glasses] . . . in their homes, in the sports clubs, in the neighborhood associations, in the parks. I have a mobile office that offers the program.³⁵

Institutional constraints lead us to expect variation in the development of clientelistic and programmatic linkages across both countries since party networks have more ability to shape access to publicly funded resources in Argentina than in Chile. Yet variation in the capacity of voters to use ideology to identify the distributive goals of parties and in the organizational structure and ability of parties to distribute publicly funded resources should generate patterns of variation within countries.

Ideology and Party Organization in Argentina and Chile

Given the differences in the institutional constraints for using political networks for the distribution of publicly funded benefits, we need to assess the ability of voters to either use ideology or rely on their proximity to political organizations to inform their distributive expectations. We expect clientelistic linkages to be strongest when voters have prior experience with strong political machines used to distribute publicly funded benefits, especially when ideology cannot serve as a cue for programmatic distribution so that proximity to such networks has greater weight in defining distributive expectations.

Using an original survey of 2,800 voters conducted in Argentina and Chile in early 2007, we show that Chilean voters could readily identify the ideological orientation of parties in a dominant left-right dimension. As shown in figure 1.1, a majority of Chileans identify the PS on the left side of the political spectrum, with 70% of respondents characterizing the party as outright left (40.3%) or center-left (30%). Seventy-six percent of respondents identify the DC in the center and locate the PPD as center-left, between the PS and the DC. Respondents also clearly identify the RN and UDI by their ideological placement on the right of the political spectrum. Thus in Chile, ideology is a useful cue for voters in defining their distributive expectations. Moreover, the post-transition Chilean party system displays remarkable ideological stability and low electoral volatility, and in every election since 1990 the two coalitions have gathered more than three-quarters of the vote.

By contrast, Argentina's two main political parties were established as catchall parties appealing to broad multiclass coalitions and thereby chose not to define themselves ideologically. The Radical Civic Union (UCR), established in the 1890s, and the Partido Justicialista (PJ), created by Juan Perón in the 1940s, lack clear




Figure 1.1. Reported Ideological Location of Largest Political Parties in Chile and Argentina

ideological niches—although the PJ possesses more extensive labor-based roots, and the Radicals a stronger appeal to the middle class.³⁶ Our survey results reflect the difficulties voters have in locating the parties ideologically. The ideological mode of the PJ, with its centrist position, only includes 21% of respondents; this increases to 47% if we combine the categories of center, center-left, and center-right. Similarly, the UCR mode includes only 18.4% of respondents, increasing to 45% if we include the categories of center, center-left, and center-right. The survey also reported a high number of nonresponses to the ideology questions: 36% of those surveyed did not respond for the PJ, and 40% for the UCR. Two of the new parties that formed in response to the 2001 economic crisis were the Alliance for a Republic of Equality (ARJ) and Republican Proposal (PRO), with better defined ideological profiles and clear programmatic goals that catered to voters on the center-left and center-right, respectively (see fig. 1.1). However, electoral support for these new parties is limited to metropolitan areas.

In sum, the weak ideological identifications of the two major parties in Argentina make it difficult for voters to use ideology as a distributive cue, whereas Chilean voters (and voters for two minor Argentine parties) can more clearly identify the policy goals of parties and coalitions. These differences in the impact of ideological cues should affect voters' capacity to form expectations about policy redistribution to groups of citizens through general criteria.

Regarding the strength of party organization, Kirschelt and Wilkinson articulate the conventional wisdom: "Because programmatic party competition does not

necessitate direct individual or indirect social-network-based monitoring of voters' electoral conduct, it is cheaper to construct organizational machines than in the clientelistic case. After all, programmatic parties need fewer personnel to manage exchange relations.³⁷ Using the same survey, we applied a measurement technique to assess the scope and structure of networks—both personal and political—so that we are able to estimate the size of networks of party activists, party candidates, and the number of voters who received gifts, favors, or handouts from each party in both countries.³⁸ Using such data, we find that, contrary to Kitschelt and Wilkinson, the number of political activists is similar across the two countries despite the different weight of ideological cues in defining political parties' future behavior. Political activists comprise up to 1.4% of the population in Argentina and 1.2% in Chile. Hence, a strong party organization may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for defining clientelistic linkages.

In spite of these similarities, there are also cross-country differences in party organization. All Chilean political parties have relatively similar contingents of activists. The Socialist Party has the largest network of activists, which includes around 45,000 people or 0.356% of the Chilean population. The PS is not much larger than its competitors: the Christian Democrats (0.299%), the PPD (0.2%), the UDI (0.2%), and the smaller RN (0.147%). By contrast, in Argentina, the contingent of PJ activists is much larger than that of their competitors. The PJ has approximately 291,000 activists, representing 0.766% of the Argentine population, almost twice the number of activists of the UCR (approximately 160,000 or 0.42% of the population). Both activist contingents are dramatically larger than those of the young PRO and ARI, which include 0.029 and 0.056% of the Argentine population, respectively. The role of the Peronist network in delivering benefits to voters has been widely documented,³⁹ but the following quotation from a personal interview with a PJ activist in the province of Buenos Aires provides a good illustration of how experience often shapes voters' perceptions:

We call it "multiplicative work": each of us has acquaintances in the street where we live, friends. We tell each of them to get out, to speak, to publicize our political work. Thanks to this "multiplicative work" we are known around here, because we do not control any media outlet. Groundwork [trabajo de base], wherever we are needed we go. They call us from some community and say: "We have a problem, the street needs repairing, the water, the septic tanks, we call the municipality and they are taking two, three days."⁴⁰

Differences in the size of activists' networks in Argentina reflect the Peronists' post-2001 electoral dominance and the fragility of new entrants in the political

system as well as the impact of historical legacies in the development of the PJ and UCR networks. That is, despite the electoral weakening of the UCR, the slow evolution of networks has endowed both parties with a greater capacity than their rivals to deliver benefits through political networks. As described by a Radical representative (and former presidential candidate): "[The UCR] is a party that keeps its organization . . . it is a network that was developed in more than a hundred years, it cannot collapse overnight. It can have ups and downs, it can go forward or backward, but it does not disappear overnight."⁴¹

Hence, networks are slow to build, and the predominance of Peronism in building its political organization reflects its impact on voters, who have firsthand experience with its capacity to deliver. According to our calculations, the number of voters who received handouts from the PJ in 2007 includes 0.48% of the population (85,000 people approximately), and is more than twice as large as that of the UCR—with 0.19% or around 72,500 voters—and much larger than those of other parties. This predominance is explained by the combined effect of larger political networks and access to fiscal resources due to the Peronist predominance in governorships and municipalities across the country.⁴²

Although networks provide capacity for delivering handouts, they do not imply that parties will choose to employ their organizational capacity in that way. This is confirmed by the differences in the range of distribution of handouts in Chile, where the Socialists have the largest network of activists, but not of handout distribution, which in their case reaches 0.11% of the population or 17,250 citizens approximately. By contrast, the UDI has a smaller network of activists than the Socialists but provides handouts to the largest number of people (0.155% of the population or 23,400 people), which still remains less than the proportion of the population reached by the Argentine Radicals. This is remarkable, given the clear ideological location of the UDI on the right of the political spectrum (see the single peaked distribution on fig. 1.1) and confirms Luna's account of an electoral strategy that combines ideological appeal from well-off voters and clientelism—financed by private funds—for poorer voters.⁴³

In short, whereas the proportion of activists in the population is similar across both countries, the differences in the way their parties work seem to be associated with the advantage of the Peronist (and to a lesser extent the Radicals) in terms of the reach of their organization and its capacity to deliver publicly funded benefits. Put differently, political networks seem to constitute a necessary but insufficient condition for the construction of clientelistic linkages between parties and voters. As a result, whereas in Argentina the larger size of the PJ activists' network correlates with the largest number of handout recipients, in Chile the Socialists have the larg-

est activists' network, but the UDI has the largest number of handout recipients. Moreover, Chilean political parties are more balanced in their level of organizational capacity than are Argentine ones, thereby reducing the incentives for any of them to increase discretion—and therefore clientelism—in the delivery of public policy, since none of them will clearly benefit.

Distributive Expectations and Social Policy in Argentina and Chile

The combination of institutional constraints on policy delivery, party organization, and ideological identification by voters leads us to expect that voters would be more likely in Chile than in Argentina to use ideology (and their ideological distance from each political party) to define their distributive expectations. However, in Argentina we expect that voters for the two new and more ideological parties could use ideology in forming their distributive expectations, even when we do not expect this to be the case for supporters of the PJ and the UCR. Moreover, in thinking about the impact of party organizations, political networks should not have a strong effect on voters' distributive expectations in Chile, but connections with party organizations should be important in defining the distributive expectations of voters regarding the Argentine PJ and UCR. We have associated these differences not only to the easier time that voters have in identifying parties' ideology in Chile and to more even nature of party organization in Chile but also to institutional differences reducing the capacity of parties to rely on networks to distribute publicly financed private goods. To assess this last effect, we use two programs that look similar on paper—the Argentine *Jefes y Jefas de Hogar* and the Chilean *Chile Solidario*—but which we expect to shape voters' expectations of receiving handouts from parties only in Argentina. Analyses from two 2007 surveys conducted in Argentina and Chile provide statistical evidence of the determinants of distributive expectations in these two countries.⁴⁴ In these surveys, we asked respondents to report, on a scale from 0 to 10, "How likely would it be that, after winning the election, [Party *i*] would provide you with [food, clothing, money, or other material benefits] or [a public job]?"⁴⁵ We then used a number of covariates to find out what determines the distributive expectations of voters.

Findings show that in Chile, a one-unit increase in ideological proximity between voters and activists from the Concertación resulted roughly in a $\approx 3\%$ increase in the expectations of receiving handouts. However, ideological proximity failed to explain expectations of handout distribution for the UDI and RN. The effect of ideological proximity on public sector employment was statistically significant for

all five Chilean parties, with a one-unit increase in ideological proximity leading to a roughly $\approx 2\%$ to $\approx 4\%$ increase in the expectations of being offered a public sector job.

While ideological proximity had a statistically significant effect in the expectation of perceiving goods in Chile, linkages to the party organization (assessed by the number of activists that voters were connected to in a sustained relationship) had no statistically significant effect on the expectation of receiving handouts and just a small effect for public sector employment by the PS and the DC. Our findings thus confirm that ideological cues had a stronger impact than party organization in shaping the distributive expectations of Chilean voters, even for non-policy-provided benefits. We also found no effect of voters' connections to the network of recipients of *Chile Solidario* on the expectation of receiving handouts. This finding confirms our expectations about institutional constraints since connections to recipients of *Chile Solidario* are a proxy for voters' experience on how the state distributes a cash transfer program that could shape their views about parties' distributive intentions. Moreover, we complement the findings of Luna on the UDI by showing that it distributes not only to poor voters but also to voters who are ideologically distant from the party and not well connected to its activists. These findings confirm interviews with UDI politicians in which they claim the provision of goods and services is a mechanism to attract voters, who can then be persuaded by the party ideas.

In Argentina, by contrast, ideological proximity between voters and parties had no statistically significant effect on the expectation of receiving handouts or a public sector employment from the Peronists or the Radicals. Conversely, the connections between voters and PJ and UCR activists does shape the expectations of receiving handouts, with a one standard deviation increase in proximity to the network of activists resulting in a $\approx 7\%$ increase in the expectation of receiving handouts from the Peronists and a $\approx 5\%$ increase in the expectation of receiving handouts from the Radicals. The effect was even stronger for public sector job offers, resulting in a 9.5% increase for the Peronists and 6.5% increase for the Radicals.⁴⁶ Moreover, in defining expectations of getting a public job, voters' connections to both the network of party activists and that of party candidates shapes their expectations in a positive way.

The more connections to party activists and candidates, the more voters are likely to expect a public job if this party wins the election. These findings correspond with the literature on Argentine politics that suggests that public jobs are more likely to be distributed among party activists or volunteers, who then can participate in political activities, whereas handouts are distributed to voters and participants in meetings.⁴⁷ Moreover, voters who are more connected to the network of recipients of *Jefes y Jefas de Hogar* (meaning they know more recipients than the average population controlling for the size of their personal network) have higher

expectations of receiving handouts from the Peronist and the Radical parties. These findings confirm our expectation that voters' experiences with the politicized pattern of distribution associated with this social policy shaped their distributive expectations for access to benefits from the PJ and the UCR. Since the PJ and the UCR are the main political parties in power at the municipal level—where this social program is administered—this finding indicates that the implementation of social policy and the role of political networks in the delivery of publicly financed benefits is crucial in shaping voters' distributive expectations in Argentina.

In short, we find that clientelistic linkages are more pervasive in Argentina, while programmatic linkages are predominant in Chile, which is in line with the findings of Luna and Mardones in this volume. However, we use a different mechanism to examine this cross-national variation, one that relies on the capacity of voters to use ideological cues to predict the distributive goals of a party as well as on institutional constraints rather than state bureaucratic capacity. These institutional constraints could also be associated with the effect of having a legislative opposition in control of policy design. Gryzmala Busse makes the argument that legislative opposition is crucial to shape institutional design and generates incentives that constrain state politicization.⁴⁸ Ana De la O applies a similar argument for the design of social policies based on conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America.⁴⁹ However, the fact that both the Peronists and the Radicals in Argentina seem reliant on the particularistic distribution of benefits through their networks speaks to the minimal impact of legislative opposition on institutional design, regardless of the bureaucratic capacity of the state, which varies widely across municipalities. Moreover, Weitz-Shapiro has shown that even when comparing the implementation of the same policy across municipalities, Argentine mayors have significant discretion, which they choose to limit by delegating to bureaucrats only when they are facing local legislatures with strong opposition representation in electoral constituencies with middle class voters.⁵⁰ In any case, the effect of institutional constraints on social policy delivery is crucial in shaping the distributive expectations of voters. However, the capacity to take advantage of the discretion provided by institutions requires political organization, and the variation within Argentina between the Peronist and Radicals on the one hand and the new ideological political parties on the other is a testament to such an effect.

Lesson for Social Policy Design

In this chapter we build on an emerging literature which recognizes that parties offer voters a portfolio of benefits that include non-excludable public policies and

excludable goods, rather than single-mindedly specializing in one of those types of benefits. We describe how voters weigh the different goods offered by parties and highlight the role of ideological affinity and partisan networks for explaining the distributive expectations of voters.

When institutional constraints limit the use of political networks and when parties provide clear ideological cues to signal policies to voters, programmatic linkages serve a more important function in shaping the distributive expectations of voters. By contrast, when there are few institutional constraints to delivering goods through partisan networks or when party labels are uninformative—for example, when party labels fail to signal future policy implementation—non-programmatic linkages play a more prominent role in shaping the distributive expectations of voters. Furthermore, as successful clientelistic and programmatic strategies reinforce existing party-voter linkages, the development of stable distributive expectations through clientelistic and programmatic strategies facilitates the sustainability of stable electoral support.

Understanding how distributive expectations are formed and maintained also provides insight into an important question raised by the participants of the conference that inspired the creation of this volume: How and why would parties decide to abandon their clientelistic (programmatic) strategies in favor of more programmatic (clientelistic) goals? Existing literature on market reforms in Latin America suggests that state retrenchment reduces the ability of political parties such as the PJ to deliver programmatic policies and generates incentives to devote more organizational resources to the delivery of non-programmatic goods.⁵¹

Our research shows that changes in the portfolio of goods offered by parties also result in a change in the developing expectations of voters, decreasing the importance that voters attach to ideological proximity (and responsiveness to policy in general) and increasing the organizational importance of local partisan networks. The specialization toward voters that are sensitized to non-programmatic distribution and the demands imposed by the parties' distribution networks make a rapid shift to more programmatic strategies difficult. However, our research also shows that party systems in both Chile and Argentina do not sing to a single tune. Voters for parties with broad distribution networks that deliver non-programmatic benefits also care about programmatic policies. Consequently, partisan realignments and exogenous shocks that increase the value of the party label should favor distributive portfolios with smaller non-programmatic content.

Our research also contributes to the understanding of the transition from predominantly clientelistic to more programmatic linkages at the country level. The shift from *Proimasol* to *Progreso/Oportunidades* identified by Luna and Mardones in

this volume suggests that either changes in state capacity or the loss of congressional support may explain the need to seek broader support from voters and parties that are sensitized to programmatic distribution or afraid of their competitive disadvantage in using political networks for social policy delivery.²² Indeed, political compromise was crucial in restricting the partisan content of programs such as *Chile Solidario*, in contrast with more politicized initiatives such as *Jefes y Jefas de Hogar* in Argentina.

Another avenue to produce a change in equilibrium can be caused by electoral realignment. When a more programmatic party, such as the Brazilian Workers Party (PT) or the Uruguayan Broad Front (FA), expands electorally and gains access to the executive seat, it has incentives to weaken local patronage machines with well-targeted social policies, as Nichter's chapter in this volume describes in relation to Brazil's Bolsa Familia program. Zucco has shown that in the case of Brazil, these policies were rewarded with more electoral support for the PT presidential candidate.²³ Similar realignments were observed in Argentina, with the UCR experiencing sustained electoral decline due to the failure to hold on to ideologically aware center-left voters after the collapse of the coalition with the FREPASO in 2001.²⁴

In short, political parties may have a predominant linkage with voters, but they combine different types of linkages with heterogeneous voters who form their distributive expectations based on their experience of access to publicly funded benefits. Successful changes in electoral strategies need to be triggered by the end of their success: that is, by voters' either demanding or rewarding policies that do not require proximity to the party networks to gain access to publicly provided benefits.

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31. The Chilean civil service is among the less politicized in the region, according to a comparative study by Merilee Grindle. The process of de-politicization was facilitated by a 1994 and 2003 reform including total quality management, process simplification, citizen rights charters, awards for innovation, information offices, and a variety of programs for improving management. According to Grindle, "recruitment processes were devised that gave presidents, ministers, and other high-level officials ultimate control over appointments, but which mandated processes of review of candidates as a way of 'rationalizing' patronage appointments at middle and upper levels" (Grindle, *Jobs for the Boys*, 349). The process was complemented by a system of party quotas within incumbent coalitions to coordinate electoral competition (by rewarding losing candidates) with government positions and to sustain

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33. Socialist President Michelle Bachelet explained this policy in a personal interview with the authors (July 14, 2009).

34. PPD representative who is a medical doctor (personal interview with authors, March 2009).

35. UDI representative (personal interview with authors, March 2009).

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38. For a description of methodology, see Ernesto Calvo and M. Victoria Murillo, "When Parties Meet Voters: Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile," *Comparative Political Studies*, forthcoming 2013.

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44. Calvo and Murillo, "When Parties Meet Voters."

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Chile's Education Transfers, 2001–2009

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The political targeting of social policy in Chile diverges from the standard predictions in the literature on distributive politics and clientelism. In this case, political distortions of social policy allocations are marginal. We attribute this result to the absence of a political-machine party in the system and to the presence of a strong and bureaucratically capable state.¹

Those two conditions (i.e., the absence of a machine party and the presence of a strong state), we argue, explain the patterns of marginal political targeting we observe in Chile. Incumbents operating in this type of context face a set of opportunities and constraints: (1) they have more autonomy than machine-party leaders to design political investment strategies, but due to their inability to implement clientelistic monitoring, they are less certain about the returns on their investments; and (2) they have less discretionary funds available than incumbents implementing less well-designed/bureaucratically monitored programs, but they also have access to better quality information for fine-tuning investments of the scarce resources that are available for political targeting.

What would be an adequate investment strategy for incumbents confronting this set of opportunities and constraints? Following the financial analogy of Magaloni et al. (2007), we claim that incumbents working within this scenario should pursue an insurance investment strategy² that is best undertaken by implementing a highly diversified portfolio that yields minimal risks (and payoffs).

The evidence we present in this chapter is consistent with this prediction and reveals two intriguing points. First, even in the context of efficient socioeconomic targeting and "cleanly" designed programs, political targeting is also present. Second, in such contexts, political investment rationales partially diverge from those observed both in machine-party cases and in those without the bureaucratic capacity to enforce technical criteria in social policy allocation.³