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Heeding to the Losers: Legislators' Trade-Policy Preferences and Legislative Behavior

Electoral incentives affect legislators' responsiveness to voters, parties, and other stakeholders. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems with party control over nominations foster party discipline and reduce legislators' responsiveness to local constituents when at odds with the party. Yet, even under closed-list PR regimes policymakers have incentives to respond to local interests who help advance their political careers. We illustrate this argument using evidence from a survey of Argentine legislators and a roll-call vote on a salient export tax bill. Despite the incentives created by the electoral regime, we find that legislators' trade-policy preferences and legislative behavior reflect the expected consequences of trade on local constituents. Our evidence suggests that catering to voters, rather than organized interests, are more likely to motivate legislators to defy their parties. These findings underscore the importance of understanding when and how catering to local constituents can affect politicians' trade policy choices.

According to received wisdom, trade provides aggregate benefits to countries opening to the world. Yet as global integration unfolded in recent decades, the distributional consequences of trade have become more apparent, resulting in the recent protectionist and populist voter backlash in the United States and beyond (Guisinger 2017; Mutz 2021). While the backlash against globalization is not restricted to the developed world, scholarship on trade policymaking mostly analyzes advanced economies and consolidated democracies. Moreover, insights on the incentives faced by individual legislators when making trade policy choices are mostly restricted to electoral regimes with single-member districts (Bailey 2001; Busch and Reinhardt 2000). Yet, electoral incentives should affect legislative behavior on trade policy in non-majoritarian systems as well. In this article, we look beyond

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developed economies and majoritarian systems to understand the politics of trade: we analyze the determinants of legislative behavior on trade in Argentina, an emerging economy with a proportional representation (PR) electoral system.

Our argument builds on insights from the literature on the institutional determinants of legislative behavior and the scholarship in international and comparative political economy analyzing the sources of trade-policy preferences.[1] According to these literatures, trade-policy outcomes should vary across and within electoral systems depending on the geographic distribution of economic activity (McGillivray 2004; Rickard 2018). Majoritarian systems tend to deliver representatives who are more responsive to the trade-policy preferences of the median voter in electoral districts. By contrast, in PR electoral systems political parties cater to different subgroups of voters within districts of larger magnitude. Moreover, party control over access to the ballot in closed-list PR systems fosters party discipline and reduces the responsiveness of individual legislators to local voters not aligned with their parties (Carey 2007, 2009; Carey and Shugart 1995; Cox 1997).

We argue that, even in closed-list PR systems, partisan discipline is conditional on incentives shaping legislators' political ambition, which do not always align with those of party leaders and which should influence legislators' revealed preferences and legislative behavior on trade policy. Regulating international trade affects relative prices of goods and services, resulting in changing patterns of production and consumption, which create winners and losers across actors and regions within a country. When electoral districts in PR systems comprise constituents experiencing differential gains and losses from trade, legislators face incentives to cater to a subset of local voters and interests who help advance their personal political careers, especially when these local interests experience negative policy effects. Such connection with local voters and interests becomes apparent even in closed-list PR electoral systems when the preferences of local constituents are not aligned with those of party leaders. As the saliency of trade policy increases, local voters and interests become more attentive to its distributional effects and to legislators' behavior. The combination of awareness and potential for blame attribution increases incentives for legislative responsiveness.[2]

We assess the empirical content of our argument by analyzing trade policymaking in Argentina at a time when trade policy was at the center of public attention. Argentina has a presidential

system with a bicameral legislature made up of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Representatives to the Lower Chamber are elected using closed-list PR and the D'Hondt seat-allocation method; each of the 24 provinces serves as an electoral district. Legislators are elected for four-year terms, and half of the members of the Chamber face reelection every two years. As a result, the average district magnitude is 5.3, but the range goes from a minimum of 2 (in 10 districts) to a maximum of 35 (in the province of Buenos Aires). Political parties are nationalized, and provincial party leaders control access to party lists and candidate ranking, while national leaders control assignments to Committees and other crucial positions within Congress. These rules reinforce partisan discipline and produce a well-documented government-opposition cleavage in Argentine legislative behavior (Aleman et al. 2018; Calvo 2014; Jones, Hwang, and Micozzi 2009; Saiegh 2011). This cleavage is stronger when the party of the president controls the House, as in the period under study.

Congressional treatment of a highly salient 2008 export tax bill in Argentina provides a good setting for testing our argument. As an agricultural exporter, Argentina benefited from higher global commodity prices in the 2000s. Yet, the favorable prices for Argentine food exports negatively impacted an overwhelming majority of voters who consume but do not produce food. Furthermore, the drop in relative prices of imports hurt producers of import-competing goods who tend to concentrate in the urban areas of the country. Seeking to lower food prices and finance redistribution to urban dwellers, the government increased taxes on agricultural exports by Executive Decree, provoking widespread protests and lockouts by agricultural producers. These protests raised public attention to the issue, forcing the President to submit the tax hike for Congressional ratification. Although Kirchner's party controlled both chambers of Congress, the export tax bill became contentious and produced defections from party discipline and was ultimately defeated in the Senate.

Given the heterogeneity of economic activities within Argentine provinces, which serve as electoral districts, we seek to identify whether the differential distributive effects of trade on subgroups of voters and interests within the provinces are reflected in the behavior of legislators who seek personal recognition despite electoral incentives to toe the party line. Because the larger electoral districts in Argentina house export-oriented and import-competing activities, we analyze whether the importance

of those activities for individual legislators are reflected in their trade-policy preferences and votes. In our tests, legislators' residence serves as a proxy for their connection to local interests and voters who help advance their political careers (Micozzi 2014a,b).

We rely on a two-pronged research design to evaluate whether the expected distributional effects of trade on local interests are reflected in legislators' stated and revealed preferences. First, we administered a survey experiment to members of the House of Representatives in the 2008 Argentine Congress to investigate their sensitivity to informational cues about the consequences of trade. We find that a legislator's sensitivity to framing effects highlighting the material consequences of trade varies systematically with the expected effects of trade on economic activity in the area where legislators reside. Representatives from import-competing areas exhibited the greatest sensitivity to frames emphasizing potentially negative effects of trade on competition and employment, which are more likely to hurt local voters.

Second, we analyze a Congressional roll-call vote on the 2008 export tax bill. We find that representatives from areas serving agricultural producers, which would be negatively affected by the export tax hike, were more likely to vote against the bill, even breaking with party discipline, than those representing import-competing regions.

In sum, legislators reacted in line with our expectations about local electoral connections: survey responses and roll-call votes reflected concerns for the well-being of losers from the policy under consideration. Our results reflect the distinctive institutional incentives generated by electoral rules and party dynamics at both the district and local levels predicted by our argument. While these findings upend expectations from traditional accounts on the dominant role of electoral institutions on trade policymaking, they are consistent with explanations about the importance of subnational representation among legislators' ambition and advancement of their political careers (Micozzi 2014a,b).

Legislators and Trade Policymaking

Legislators' trade policy choices are likely to reflect personal and induced preferences. In contrast to voters, elected officials have a better understanding of the aggregate benefits of trade, and hence they are supportive of trade openness. Moreover, given the incentives created by the electoral regime, legislators'

policy positions should also align with those of the party under which they are elected to Congress and thereby with their parties' core constituents, who could be net winners or losers from trade. Yet even when candidates select themselves into parties that are aligned with their policy preferences, and electoral institutions create incentives to follow the party line, we should expect legislators to internalize the impact of trade on constituencies who help advance their own careers.

Electoral institutions and the geographic distribution of economic activities define legislators' incentives when voting on trade policy (McGillivray 2004; Menendez 2016; Rickard 2018). Studies of plurality systems have shown that legislators are responsive to trade shocks that hurt their constituents, especially as electoral competition increases (Bailey 2001; Busch and Reinhardt 2000; Feingenbaum and Hall 2015). However, the literature does not expect much responsiveness to voters from legislators elected under closed-list PR where "party leaders draw up lists of candidates that are presented in general elections and cannot be altered by voters" (Carey 2007, 93; see also Carey 2009; Cox 1997; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005). Indeed, in PR electoral systems parties cater to diffuse beneficiaries from trade across many districts rather than to the concentrated losers from a particular district (Rickard 2018).

We argue, however, that in closed-list PR electoral systems legislators are likely to internalize the expected distributive effects of trade on those local voters and interests who play an important role in helping advance their individual political careers, even when in opposition to district-wide constituents aligned with their party. This local connection makes individual legislators valuable to parties eager to garner support from broader groups of voters within the larger electoral district. Yet catering to local constituents creates conflicting pressure when legislators from the same party represent dissimilar interests within a district housing heterogeneous economic activities. Hence, within-district variation in the sensitivity of different voters to trade could affect legislators' attitudes and behavior. If local voters and interests are particularly hurt by the policy, legislators may even break with their party. Such a break signals responsiveness to local constituents whose loyalty helps legislators advance their careers beyond Congress, at subnational or even national levels (Chasquetti and Micozzi 2014; Kernecker 2017; Samuels 2003). The incentive to side with local

interests against the party is stronger as trade policy becomes more salient.

Local voters and organized interest hurt by trade policy generate similar incentives for legislators. Yet while much of the literature focuses on legislators' attention to interest groups representing concentrated producers affected by trade, we are interested in responsiveness to local constituencies who could affect individual legislators' political ambition, especially when issue salience enhances voters' attention to legislative behavior.

We derive trade-policy preferences of local voters and interests as a function of the expected direct and indirect distributional consequences of trade. As discussed in Appendix B, irrespective of the underlying trade model, the impact of trade on households depends on household sources of income and employment net of taxes and transfers and on the prices of the goods they consume. Economic theory suggests that trade policy affects the relative prices of tradable goods directly and prices of nontradable services indirectly. These changes in relative prices affect the quantities of goods produced and consumed, and hence the real income of economic actors in the tradable and nontradable sectors.

An import tax raises the relative price of imports, which increases the return to inputs used intensively in producing import-competing goods. By Lerner's symmetry an export tax has a similar effect to an import tariff: it depresses the returns to domestic producers of the taxed good and benefits domestic consumers by lowering prices of a good that they consume but do not produce (Lerner 1936). The revenue derived from tariffs and export taxes may also affect individual income through fiscal transfers, which could reinforce or mitigate the effect of changing prices on individuals' real incomes (Bastiaens and Rudra 2018).

Importantly, trade also affects income and consumption in the nontradable sector, which in most countries is the largest source of employment and economic activity. Prices of nontradable services adjust to trade, affecting labor and business incomes, and consumption even for individuals who are not directly engaged in exporting or import competing industries (see Appendix B). The net real-income effect depends on the composition of the basket of goods consumed by the household: in a country that is a net exporter of food, for instance, trade openness negatively affects households in the service sector who consume but do not produce food.

In short, in closed-list PR electoral systems with large electoral districts housing both winners and losers from trade, legislators are forced to internalize the preferences of their parties' district-wide constituents as well as the preferences of local interests and constituents who can influence the legislator's political ambition. When the stakes and saliency of the vote are high, legislators have stronger incentives to be responsive to local constituents even if that brings them to defy the party line. A party interested in maximizing voters and catering to the diffuse interest of consumers or recipients of fiscal subsidies may run against the concentrated losses suffered by subgroups of voters and local interests who are hurt by export taxes or import restrictions alike. The implications for legislative behavior vary depending on the geographic distribution of economic activity. To place our empirical analyses in perspective, we turn to the Argentine case.

Constituency Links and Trade Policy in 2008 Argentina

In the early 2000s, a sharp devaluation of the Argentine peso along with a surge in the international price of commodities generated a boom in Argentine exports of primary products and manufactured goods of primary origin. By contrast, Argentine imports were mostly industrial products, which experienced a relative decline in world (and consequently local) prices as the country's trade expanded (CEP 2008).

Improving terms of trade and trade expansion helped Argentina grow, but it generated stark distributional consequences. The hike in agricultural prices increased agricultural output and exports, leading to sharp increases in the domestic price of food. In this environment, Presidents Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2015) embraced protectionism and enacted redistributive policies in favor of urban and low-income voters; these included export restrictions, price controls on food, and agricultural export taxes. The latter served two purposes: they financed the government's redistribution efforts and contained rising food prices.[3] Export taxes accrued to the federal government, granting discretion to the President on transfers to provincial governments. The highest tax rate fell on exports of soybean and its by-products, which were not consumed locally: 99% of soybeans and 94% of soybean oil were exported (Richardson 2012, 33; INDEC 2007).

In response to rising prices, soybean production expanded to 15 of the 24 Argentine provinces, accounting for half of total export value in 2007 (Barsky and Davila 2009, 331, 339). As the price of soybean increased, the government kept raising export taxes: in March 2008, the tax rate rose from 35% to 41% with a sliding scale linked to the international price of soybean. The marginal rate rose to 68% when soybean value reached US$1,000/tn. Farmers rejected the taxes and responded with lockouts, protests, and road blockades, creating food shortages and prompting countermobilizations by labor unions and organized groups of the unemployed. Social mobilization increased the salience of trade taxes and public awareness of their distributive effects (Barsky and Davila 2009; Hora 2010).

President Cristina Kirchner—whose party controlled both Chambers of Congress—sent a bill seeking Congressional ratification of the new tax regime; the revenue collected from the export taxes would fund subsidies for transportation and infrastructure projects targeted at the poorer provinces. Approved by a narrow margin in the Lower House, the bill was ultimately killed in the Senate, where the vice-president cast the tie-breaking vote.

The salience of the export tax bill is reflected in media coverage. A third of total news coverage in the two largest newspapers (*Clarín* and *La Nación*) and the progovernment *Página 12* covered the topic. Moreover, the three featured the bill on their front pages in all but five days between the announcement of the bill and its defeat (Zunino 2015, 229–33, 281). To illustrate the salience of the bill, we report the frequency of two key words, export taxes ("retenciones") and soybean ("soja"), on the pages of *El Parlamentario*, a daily consulted by Argentine legislators. The frequency of articles mentioning both words peaked in 2008 (Figure 1(a)), especially in July 2008 when the export tax bill was considered by Congress (Figure 1(b)). We can infer that legislators were aware of the salience of the issue and the heightened political stakes, particularly those whose careers depended on their responsiveness to local constituents who would be negatively affected by the bill.

Expectations about Legislators' Trade Preferences and Behavior

The effects of trade on consumption, income, taxes, and government spending vary systematically across geographic regions in Argentina. Differences in the expected impact of trade on regional

FIGURE 1
(a) Articles on Export Taxes ("retenciones") or Soybean ("soja") in El Parlamentario. (b) Articles on Export Taxes ("retenciones") or Soybean ("soja") in El Parlamentario, 2008



economic activity are also salient within Argentine provinces, which serve as electoral districts: producers of import-competing manufactured goods, who reside in urban areas, tend to lose from

openness; agricultural producers in rural areas benefit from selling their products in global markets.

Due to low mobility across Argentine regions, trade openness also has differential geographical impacts on service-sector actors: income effects are likely to be positive for nontradable activities in areas serving agricultural production and negative for services in areas dominated by import-competing industries (Porto 2006; Porto and Lodola 2013). The demand for services is stronger in the towns and cities of the hinterland, which benefit from the multiplying effect of expanding agricultural production (Barsky and Davila 2009; Bisang et al. 2008), and declines in large urban centers where import-competing industries concentrate.

In sum, opening trade has positive effects on the demand for agricultural production and indirectly in the demand for services in the areas serving agricultural producers. Higher trade has negative real-income effects for producers of import-competing goods and for those in urban areas servicing the declining import-competing industries. Trade raises the domestic price of food, affecting consumers in all areas.

These different regional effects are reflected in the formation of trade-policy cleavages cutting across voters within the same electoral districts or provinces. The protectionist coalition is built around the major industrial cities of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Rosario, and their metropolitan areas, which concentrate import-competing industries and population exposed to higher food prices. In the export-oriented areas, expanding trade has a direct positive effect on agricultural producers and an indirect positive one on those employed in the service sector, which is weakened by higher food prices. Indeed, a contemporaneous public opinion survey reflected these regional preferences: lower support for trade in import-competing and urban regions than in export-oriented areas (Ardanaz, Murillo, and Pinto 2013).

While closed-list PR promotes legislative discipline, political ambition and career advancement for Argentine legislators is tied to local constituencies, whose support is crucial to gain political offices at the national, provincial, or municipal level. This local connection also makes a candidate appealing for placement in the party's legislative list. Because the expected consequences of trade vary across actors within the same electoral district, they generate distinct incentives on legislators' preferences depending on their connection to local, as opposed to district-wide, constituencies. Hence, when assessing the impact of trade policy on economic

activity, we expect greater sensitivity by legislators representing areas suffering material losses, which mobilize actors negatively affected by the policy (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

We explore legislators' preferences by analyzing their responses to a survey experiment. Legislators are more educated than average voters, a trait associated with protrade stances. We expect their responses to weigh the positive welfare gains more heavily and be supportive of free trade. Additionally, legislators seek information to signal their competence to voters; more informed actors tend to hold stronger priors and be better at processing informational cues. Hence, legislators should be less influenced by framing effects than the general public (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman 2001a, 2001b; Druckman et al. 2010; Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998). Nevertheless, we expect legislators' support for openness to change when forced to ponder the distributive consequences of trade, especially when raising trade's negative effects on the local constituents who shape legislators' political careers. Hence, even though we expect weak framing effects among legislators, their support for openness should decline when negative consequences of trade experienced by their local constituents are brought to the fore.

H1: When exposed to frames linking openness to potential losses in employment and economic activity, support for trade should decline.

Given the different distributive effects of trade, we expect heterogeneous framing effects among legislators residing in different regions of the country.

H1.1: Framing effects highlighting trade losses are stronger for legislators who reside in import-competing areas.

To probe the impact on the distributional consequences of trade on legislative behavior, we analyze the roll-call vote on the 2008 export tax bill. The tax negatively affected the income of agricultural producers and indirectly the income of economic actors in the areas servicing agriculture, while benefiting economic agents in import-competing regions by depressing the relative price of food and raising government revenue for redistribution to urban

constituencies.[4] Hence, we expect negative effects on local constituents to influence legislators' votes.

H2: Legislators from agricultural (manufacturing) producing areas are more likely to vote against (for) export taxes.

Legislators' Preferences: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

We surveyed members of the Lower House of the Argentine Congress in 2008. We designed an experimental module embedded in the survey to assess whether legislators respond to framing effects. Given their education, knowledge and sophistication, and central position in the political system, legislators should be better than voters at identifying complex policy frames, making them more favorable to trade and less malleable to framing effects. Yet we expect legislators to be sensitive to informational cues that highlight the distributional consequences of trade on the well-being of local constituents. Legislators randomly received informational cues designed to highlight different consequences of trade openness. We contrast legislators' responses under these different treatment conditions to identify patterns associated with the distributional consequences of trade for their local constituents.

The Survey Instrument

The survey was fielded during the fourth quarter of 2008, in the aftermath of the legislative vote on the agricultural export tax bill. We collected responses from 200 of 257 members of the Lower Chamber of Congress.[5] Enumerators were employees of *Directorio Legislativo*, an Argentine NGO that covers legislative activity. The survey included an experimental section in which legislators were randomly assigned to one of three different groups: two groups received different treatment conditions, and a third group served as control. The experimental cues made respondents evaluate different dimensions of the expected distributional consequences of trade. In particular, we induced legislators to evaluate the effects of trade on employment, competition, and prices before recording their support for trade under different treatment conditions.

A first group received an introductory frame emphasizing the belief that trade lowers employment and hurts local producers: "Many people believe that increasing trade with other nations creates unemployment and hurts Argentine producers." A second group received an introduction emphasizing the effect of trade on job creation for competitive sectors and on lowering consumer prices: "Many people believe that increasing trade with other nations creates jobs and allows consumers to buy goods and services at lower prices." A third group of respondents was given no introduction, serving as control group. To mitigate the "desirability" bias usually found in survey responses, we present the price frame in positive terms and the competition/unemployment frame in negative terms. Similar positive and negative frames have been shown to reduce support for trade in public opinion surveys in the United States and Argentina (Ardanaz, Murillo, and Pinto 2013; Hiscox 2006).

As legislators are sophisticated and informed, framing the impact of trade as positive or negative is likely to be less relevant than including the expected effects of openness on employment, competition, and prices, which highlight the potential gains and losses from trade. This is consistent with theoretical and empirical contributions in political psychology, which suggest that framing effects occur when in the course of describing a phenomenon, a speaker's emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on those conditions when establishing their opinions (Druckman 2001b, 226–31; Druckman et al. 2010).

Legislators in the three groups were asked the following question: *"Do you agree or disagree with the statement that Argentina should increase its trade with other nations?"* and could choose among: "strongly agree," "somewhat agree," "somewhat disagree," "strongly disagree," "indifferent," and "don't know," or "no answer."

Survey Results

Argentine legislators were overwhelmingly supportive of trade when no other consideration is provided. As shown in Figure 2, in the control group, 91% strongly agree and 9% somewhat agree with increasing trade with other nations.[6] The treatment changes the distribution of responses about support for

FIGURE 2
Support for Openness by Frame



trade, particularly reflected in a drop in strongly supporting openness: under the production/employment frame, the category "strongly agree" declines to 71%.[7] The drop is mostly absorbed by the category "somewhat agree," suggesting that even sophisticated and informed respondents are less supportive of openness when distributive consequences of trade are made salient.[8] This 20 percentage point decline, statistically significant at a $p < 0.01$, provides supportive evidence for Hypothesis 1 and serves as a baseline to analyze potential heterogeneous framing effects. Figure A2.1 in Appendix 2 includes the price and competition treatment condition. The negative impact of the price and competition frame, despite being presented as positive due to the falling prices of imported goods, could be attributed to the salience of inflation which was linked to the impact of the rise in international prices of agricultural exports on the domestic price of food. The government embraced this argument to justify enacting trade restrictions.

We further explore whether personal characteristics and electoral incentives reduce support for openness. Among the personal features, education, which was theorized to affect trade preferences and sensitivity to framing effects, does not have a significant

mitigating effect (Figure A2.2, Appendix A2). We do not find partisan differences either: being elected on the FPV ticket is not significant in predicting differences in treatment effects (Figure A2.3). In sum, while legislators are negatively swayed by the employment and production frame, these effects do not seem to be related to education, personal ideology, or even partisanship, which drives legislative behavior in the Argentine Congress.

Next, we explore whether responses are affected by emphasizing the distributional effects of trade. To assess whether legislators' responses reflect concerns about losers from trade in their districts, we exploit the uneven regional economic structure in Argentina and classify legislators based on industrial production in their areas of residence within the electoral districts.

Industrial production is our proxy for import-competing areas; we expect lower support for trade in these areas due to negative effect of trade on workers and businesses in the manufacturing sector, and the indirect effects on the demand for nontradable services. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix present data on the distribution of economic activity and employment across states, which serve as electoral districts, and for regions within states for the largest provinces. To classify electoral districts and localities within large districts as import competing, we use the proportion of manufacturing employment and output; those areas with higher proportion of agricultural activity are classified as nonimport competing. We create an "import-competing" dummy which takes a value of one for legislators with legal residence in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires (AMBA, the City of Buenos Aires and its suburbs), La Plata, Rosario, and the city of Córdoba: these areas house half of Argentina's population and have the highest concentration of manufacturing activities. In the statistical analysis, we also use continuous measures of industrial, agricultural, and service production to capture the relative importance of import-competing and exporting interests.

As expected, Figure 3 shows that strong support for trade declines 31.7 percentage points among legislators from import-competing areas who receive the production frame, falling from 89% with no frame to 57% with the production frame, a difference that is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. The drop is smaller for legislators representing nonimport competing districts (from 91% to 77%, a drop of 13.8 percentage points, significant at $p < 0.10$).[9] In sum, emphasizing the negative impacts of trade on production and employment reduces the level of support for trade among

FIGURE 3
Support for Openness by Frame and Region



legislators, with a stronger negative response among legislators from import-competing areas, in line with Hypothesis 1.1.

Statistical Analyses

To estimate the average treatment effects on the probability of supporting trade across different groups of legislators, we rely on statistical analyses.[10] Given the structure of the responses ranging from "no response" to "strongly agree," we create a dummy variable which equals one if a respondent strongly agrees with the statement.

The probit models presented in Table 1 include all the relevant characteristics discussed. We also control for legislators' ideology and votes on the export tax bill.[11] In model 3 in Table 1 we include a measure of soybean production, which played an important role in contemporary policy debates about trade. The variable measures the percentage of land devoted to soy production in 2007 in the areas where legislators reside. The data comes from the Ministry of Agriculture (Appendix A1).

TABLE 1
Legislators' Support for Trade

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Import-competing Region	−0.200	−0.210	−0.266	−0.127	−0.132	−0.206	0.150
(M-comp)	(0.222)	(0.208)	(0.198)	(0.413)	(0.421)	(0.419)	(0.367)
Price Frame	−0.675***	−0.667***	−0.620***	−0.782**	−0.766**	−0.741**	−0.748**
	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.207)	(0.336)	(0.333)	(0.344)	(0.345)
M-comp × Price Frame				0.236	0.221	0.275	0.020
				(0.402)	(0.393)	(0.375)	(0.438)
Production Frame	−0.762***	−0.740***	−0.703**	−0.600**	−0.573**	−0.528*	−0.567**
	(0.279)	(0.282)	(0.305)	(0.272)	(0.278)	(0.294)	(0.276)
M-comp × Production Frame				−0.441	−0.455	−0.466	−0.652
				(0.535)	(0.540)	(0.578)	(0.504)
FPV Legislator		−0.064	0.014		−0.074	−0.002	
		(0.208)	(0.213)		(0.208)	(0.228)	
College or More		0.127	0.163		0.118	0.158	
		(0.283)	(0.289)		(0.276)	(0.282)	
Soy Planted			1.598			1.770	
			(1.190)			(1.438)	
Vote for Export Taxes (Res. 125/08)			−0.088			-0.079	
			(0.55)			(0.292)	
District Magnitude						0.0001	
						(0.004)	
Ideology							0.055
							(0.077)
Constant	1.378***	1.311***	1.148***	1.348***	1.290***	1.114***	1.060***
	(0.246)	(0.272)	(0.366)	(0.269)	(0.324)	(0.3996)	(0.387)

(Continues)

TABLE 1
(Continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
pseudo-R^2	0.004	0.056	0.066	0.063	0.065	0.077	0.069
Log pseudo-likelihood	−98.52	−98.31	−97.29	−97.52	−97.32	−96.16	−86.20
Wald χ^2	13.56	13.59	19.19	30.64	40.08	308.36	39.22
$p > \chi^2$	0.054	0.019	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	200	200	200	200	200	200	179

Note: Standard errors clustered at province in parentheses. DV: Strong support for increasing trade.

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

FIGURE 4
Strongly Support for Openness by Production Frame and Region



Note: Predicted probabilities and 90% confidence intervals of responding "Strongly Agree" (Model 5 in Table 1). $^{**}p < 0.05$ for differences between treatment and control groups

The most important finding is the negative association between support for trade in the groups receiving the production (and price) frame. Models 4–87 in Table 1 include interaction terms for the treatment condition and the import-competing dummy. The marginal effect of the production frame on the probability of strongly supporting trade in these models cannot be interpreted from the coefficients and standard errors reported in the table.[12] Figure 4 presents the predicted probabilities (and confidence intervals) for legislators from the two areas under the treatment and control conditions. These results suggest that when exposed to the production frame, legislators from import-competing regions—who represent voters and interests negatively affected by trade—are less likely to support trade openness (H1.1.).

Among legislators residing in import-competing regions, the difference in the probability of strongly supporting trade between the control and the treated group is statistically significant, substantively large, and similar to the bivariate differences

FIGURE 5
Differences in Support for Trade Among Respondents from Import Competing and non-Import Competing Regions



Note: Differences in predicted probabilities and 90% confidence intervals of responding "Strongly Agree" among respondents from import-competing and non-import competing areas based on estimates from Model 5 in Table 1.

presented above: 31.4 percentage points. By contrast, whereas in the nonimport-competing regions support for openness declines 12.8 percentage points among legislators receiving the production and employment frame relative to the control group (also statistically significant), the marginal treatment effect is less than half the size of the framing effects observed in import-competing regions.[13] Lastly, we find no sizable regional differences in support for trade among legislators in the control group, but sizable differences between respondents in the import-competing and nonimport-competing regions under the production frame, as reflected in Figure 5.

To further probe the influence of import-competing interests, Table 2 presents models with a continuous measure of manufacturing share of regional output (one of the components used in creating the import-competing dummy) and the measure of soy

TABLE 2
Support for Trade by Industrial Output and Soy Production

	(1)	(2)
Price Frame	−0.593***	−0.592
	(0.205)	(0.408)
Production Frame	−0.699**	−0.262
	(0.290)	(0.395)
Industrial Product (%)	−0.023**	−0.016
	(0.010)	(0.022)
Soy Planted	2.132*	2.674
	(1.265)	(2.207)
Price Frame × Industrial Product		−0.010
		(0.030)
Production Frame × Industrial Product		−0.014
		(0.025)
Price Frame × Soy Planted		2.498
		(3.756)
Production Frame × Soy Planted		−2.463
		(3.991)
Constant	1.461***	1.293***
	(0.311)	(0.407)
pseudo-R^2	0.072	0.0872
Log pseudo-likelihood	−96.64	−95.024
Wald χ^2	27.87	43.29
$p > \chi^2$	0.000	0.000
N	200	200

Note: Standard errors clustered at province in parentheses. DV: Strong support for increasing trade.

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

planted in a legislators' residence. Model 1 shows that industrial production is negatively associated, and soy planted is positively associated, with strongly supporting trade liberalization. The production and price frames return negative coefficients. In model 2, we interact both frames with manufacturing and soy production.

We present the marginal effects of the interactive model in Figure 6(a). Figure 6(b) shows that a 1 percentage point increase in manufacturing share is associated with a 1 percentage point decrease in the probability of strongly supporting trade liberalization; the estimated association is significant at a $p < .05$. Yet we find no significant effect of manufacturing output under the price frame or in the control group. Soy planted in the region where a legislator resides has no discernible impact on support for trade

FIGURE 6
(a) Panel: Average Marginal Effects of Industrial Production.
(b) Panel: Average Marginal Effects of Soy Planted in District



Note: (a) Average marginal effects of industrial production based on estimates from Model 2 in Table 2. (b) Average marginal effects of soy production based on estimates from Model 1 in Table 2.

liberalization in the control group or under the production frame, but it is positively associated with strongly supporting trade for respondents receiving the price frame (Figure 6(b)). The finding for soy production results suggests that legislators from regions housing exporting activities, that is, those regions where trade results in net welfare gains, are more likely to be swayed by the frame about the positive impact of liberalization. As we show in the next section, soy production and manufacturing output help connect the analysis of survey responses with legislators' behavior.

In sum, we find supportive evidence that legislators are malleable to framing effects in a way that can be systematically associated with the expected material consequences of trade (H1). Framing questions about openness in terms of trade's distributive effects further affects the level of legislators' stated support for trade. Legislators seem to be particularly sensitive to negative consequences of trade that affect their local constituencies. Framing effects are stronger among legislators representing areas concentrating the losers from trade liberalization (H1.1).

These results align with our expectations that legislators' concerns about the distributive effects of trade on their local constituencies influence their trade-policy preferences. We now turn to investigate whether these distributional concerns also shape their legislative behavior on trade policy, even in a setting where strong incentives to follow party discipline should weaken the local connection.

Legislative Behavior: The Export Tax Bill

Our analysis of the roll-call vote in the Lower House aims to assess whether *legislators from agricultural producing areas are more likely to vote against the export tax bill* (H2). In Argentina, electoral institutions and political ambition generate incentives on legislators to both follow the party line and attend to local constituents; these incentives may run in opposite directions. On the one hand, the motivation to follow the party line is determined by party leaders' control of access to the ballot and candidate position on the list within the electoral district. In this setting district-wide constituency influence would be captured by the party position and result in a government-opposition cleavage (Aleman et al. 2018; Calvo 2014; Saiegh 2011).

On the other hand, legislators whose political careers depend on a personal connection to local voters should be more responsive

to demands from their local constituents over the preferences of the district-wide party voters. In large electoral districts comprising voters in both import-competing urban areas and rich agricultural producing areas, legislators face cross-cutting incentives from winners and losers from the policy. If district-wide electoral incentives dominate, we expect a legislator's residence within the district to play no role in determining their vote for or against the export tax bill. We expect the local connection to losers from the bill who reside in export-oriented areas to exercise a strong incentive to oppose the bill, even against party discipline. Note that this local connection could reflect responsiveness to local voters or organized interests. While both mechanisms are probably at play, we provide evidence that catering to voters likely played a more important role.

The export tax bill passed the Lower House by 129 to 122 votes; 18 legislators from the incumbent FPV and 10 legislators from allied parties broke party lines and voted against passage of the bill (see Table A3.1 in Appendix A3).[14] Our analysis focuses on the conditions affecting the probability of supporting the bill in the Lower House and whether those conditions also explain defections from the government caucus.

We use the same variables as before to capture the expected distributive consequences of the bill on local voters: the first variable is soy production in the legislator's district, described above. Figure 7 illustrates our measure of expected local constituency interests: it maps the proportion of planted soybean across areas within states. Since soybean is the main target of the export tax, this variable captures the local concentration of losers from the export tax bill. Other variables include the "import-competing" dummy and the sectoral shares of production and employment at the local level.

The bill included a provision to spend proceeds from export taxes on social transfers and public-works projects in poorer provinces. To capture the motivation for supporting export taxes based on the expectation that a province would be a net recipient of federal transfers, we create a continuous variable, "public employment," which measures the proportion of provincial employment on the federal government payroll per 1,000 inhabitants.[15] Except for the city of Buenos Aires, which houses the federal administration, this variable serves as a proxy for dependence on the fiscal largesse of the central administration to which the export taxes

FIGURE 7
Areas Planted with Soybean



A1.

accrue. We expect provinces with larger shares of public employees to benefit from the fiscal component of the trade bill.

To evaluate the impact of electoral incentives, we rely on measures of partisanship and district magnitude. The governing coalition was built around a faction of the Peronist Party called

the Front for Victory (FPV). In the 2007 presidential election, the FPV formed an electoral alliance with a faction of the Radical Party (Union Cívica Radical, or UCR), informally known as the *Radicales-K (or Radicals for Kirchner)*, and with other minor parties. The opposition camp was splintered into different groups, including a traditional faction of the Peronist Party which rejected the leadership of the Kirchners, the majority of the Radical Party (UCR), the Civic Coalition (Coalición Cívica or CC), the right-leaning Republican Proposal (Propuesta Republicana, or PRO), and a number of provincial and minor parties. Hence, our measures of partisanship are based on membership in the legislative tickets of the FPV, Radicales K, allied parties, and opposition.[16] To control for district magnitude, we use a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for electoral districts (provinces) with a magnitude greater than eight, the median district magnitude in the country.

Legislative behavior could reflect a strategic response to organized interests, who harbor intense preferences, or responsiveness to local voters affected by the effects of the export tax on the local economy—as measured by soybean production. Both types of local connections could generate incentives that run against partisan discipline. The literature suggest that producers' influence was reduced by their low numbers, but their mobilization likely raised the saliency of the issue shifting local public opinion (Freytes 2015; Hora 2010). To assess the effect of organized agricultural producers over the vote, we include the number of rural lockouts in the local district in 2008. To further probe these mechanisms, we present evidence of local electoral losses attributed to the bill.

We fit a probit regression where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the legislator voted in favor of the export tax bill. Alignment with the incumbent FPV and allied parties should be a strong predictor of voting for the export tax, as the bill was presented as a referendum on the Executive's performance. We also expect a negative correlation between the "soy planted" and the probability of voting in favor of the export tax, and a positive association for the "import-competing" and "public employment" variables based on income and fiscal motivations respectively.

Tables 3–5 present the results from the roll-call vote analysis. The strongest determinant of the vote on the trade tax bill is partisanship, measured as membership in a progovernment party

TABLE 3
Roll Call Vote on Export Tax Bill

	DV: Vote on Export Taxes (Res. 125)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
FPV	3.651***	3.489***	3.920***	3.905***	3.861***	3.803***	4.094***
	(0.430)	(0.392)	(0.462)	(0.461)	(0.441)	(0.430)	(0.586)
FPV Allies	2.861***	2.739***	2.941***	2.944***	2.921***	2.867***	2.875***
	(0.540)	(0.594)	(0.566)	(0.568)	(0.565)	(0.563)	(0.533)
Radical K	2.924***	2.555***	3.046***	3.043***	2.989***	2.951***	3.497***
	(0.499)	(0.489)	(0.534)	(0.536)	(0.518)	(0.512)	(0.669)
Import Competing Region	0.542*		0.786**	0.850**	0.730*	0.548	1.116**
	(0.310)		(0.339)	(0.347)	(0.380)	(0.4322)	(0.524)
Soy planted		−2.593**	−3.687***	−3.333**	−3.437**	−3.246**	−4.004**
		(1.242)	(1.287)	(1.320)	(1.353)	(1.341)	(1.801)
Public employment				0.005	0.005	0.005	0.012*
				(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
District magnitude					0.003	0.006	0.002
					(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Lockouts						−0.181	
						(0.173)	
Legislator ideology							−0.279***
							(0.103)
Constant	−2.691***	−2.133***	−2.641***	−2.917***	−2.959***	−2.901***	−2.450***
	(0.419)	(0.397)	(0.459)	(0.554)	(0.568)	(0.570)	(0.861)
pseudo-R^2	0.586	0.586	0.606	0.607	0.608	0. 611	0.647

(Continues)

TABLE 3
(Continued)

	DV: Vote on Export Taxes (Res. 125)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Log pseudo-likelihood	−73.77	−73.70	−70.25	−69.97	−69.83	−69.26	−43.37
Wald χ^2	74.55	88.51	82.10	83.65	90.30	93.52	70.44
$p > \chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	257	257	257	257	257	257	179

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. DV: Vote on Export Tax Bill (Res. 125).

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

TABLE 4
Roll Call Vote—Regional Output and Employment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FPV	4.082***	5.278***	5.502***	5.095***
	(0.510)	(1.062)	(1.055)	(0.866)
FPV Allies	3.478***	4.922***	4.235***	3.888***
	(0.673)	(1.432)	(0.900)	(0.757)
Radical K	3.605***	4.745***	4.782***	4.335***
	(0.689)	(1.206)	(1.103)	(0.920)
Soy Planted	−3.421**	−1.091	−7.067***	−5.400***
	(1.490)	(1.603)	(2.373)	(1.889)
Manufacturing Gross Regional Product (%)	0.090***			
	(0.025)			
Services Gross Regional Product (%)	0.061***	0.069***		
	(0.017)	(0.027)		
Agriculture Gross Regional Product (%)		−0.123**		
		(0.054)		
Manufacturing Employment (%)			0.166***	
			(0.047)	
Service Employment (%)			0.175***	0.018
			(0.055)	(0.025)
Agriculture Employment (%)				−0.139***
				(0.041)
Public Employment	0.026**	0.006	0.019***	0.011**
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
District Magnitude	−0.008	−0.004	−0.011	−0.006
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Constant	−9.355***	−7.888***	−19.462***	−3.539*
	(2.034)	(2.346)	(5.198)	(2.109)
pseudo-R^2	0.651	0.661	0.654	0.644
Log pseudolikelihood	−62.11	−60.41	−61.67	−63.39
Wald χ^2	98.44	51.10	50.20	53.46
$p > \chi^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	257	257	257	257

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. DV: Vote on Export Tax Bill (Res. 125).
*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

caucus: we find significant effects for FPV, and also for Allied parties, and representatives identified as Radicales-K. Based on the estimates from Model (1), the probability of a positive vote among members of the FPV caucus is 88% and 85% for legislators belonging to the parties in the governing coalition.

As expected, we find an 8 percentage points higher predicted probability of voting for the export tax among legislators

TABLE 5
Analysis of Roll Call Vote on Nationalization of Pension Funds

	(1)
FPV	1.544***
	(0.188)
Import Competing Region	0.264
	(0.216)
Soy planted	0.693
	(1.033)
Public employment	0.004
	(0.005)
District magnitude	−0.005
	(0.004)
Constant	−0.563
	(0.363)
pseudo-R^2	0.239
Log pseudolikelihood	−128.87
Wald χ^2	69.77
$p > \chi^2$	0.000
N	257

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent Variable = 1 if vote = Yes for nationalization, 0 otherwise.

***$p < 0.01$.

representing import-competing areas (statistically significant at $p < 0.05$). This effect becomes substantively and statistically stronger once the effect of soybean is accounted for (Models 3–7): in Model 3, for instance, legislators from import-competing regions are 10 percentage points more likely to vote for the export tax; (the difference is significant at $p < 0.05$). Conversely, "soy planted"—our proxy for preferences of voters in soy producing regions—has a negative and significant effect on support for the bill (Model 2). The probability of voting for the export tax at the lowest level of soy planted is 54% and drops to 41% for districts with the largest percentage of soy planted providing support for Hypothesis 2.[17] Ideology is associated with the trade vote: right-leaning legislators are less likely to vote for the export tax (Model 7).[18] The effect of "public employment" is in the expected direction, but it is not statistically significant (except in model 7). District magnitude is not statistically significant either (Models 5 and 7). More importantly, in contrast to "soy planted," "lockouts" has no significant effects

FIGURE 8
Predicted Probabilities of Voting for the Export Tax. (a) All Legislators, by soy production in district. (b) By party and soy production in district



Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals from estimates in Model 4 in Table 3

suggesting that interest-group protests are not the main source of pressure on legislators.

The marginal effects can be observed in Figure 8(a), which plots the probability of voting in favor of the bill as a function of "soy planted" in the legislators' district using estimated coefficients from Model 3 in Table 3. Whereas partisanship is a strong predictor of the vote, the probability of voting against the government drops as the proportion of soy planted in the legislator's district increases. Note that while soy production affects all legislators, the lower support for the bill among non-FPV legislators reflects a floor effect in the probit model; hence the marginal effect looks stronger for legislators from the government party as reflected in Figure 8(b). Table A2.2 reproduces results from a nonlinear specification, where soy planted is interacted with legislators' party, which suggest that there is no interactive effect: legislators from both government and opposition camps are less likely to vote for the export tax bill as soybean production increases. The predicted probabilities for the interactive model are presented in Figure A2.7 in the appendix.

To further probe the impact of economic interests on legislators' incentives to vote for or against trade restrictions, we fit models replacing soy production and the import competition dummy with variables measuring the proportion of the gross regional product in agriculture, manufacturing, and services in the electoral district (Models 1–2 in Table 4). Since the measures are a proportion of sectoral to total output, we exclude manufacturing output in Model 1 and agricultural output in Model 2.

As reflected in Model 1, industrial output is associated with a higher probability of voting for the export tax; the relationship is substantively and statistically significant. To illustrate the substantive impact, Figure 9 uses the estimated coefficients from Model 1 to compute changes in predicted probabilities of supporting the export tax by varying manufacturing output while holding all other variables constant at their mean. We find that a 1 standard deviation increase from the observed mean in the proportion of manufacturing to total district output is associated with a 10.5 percentage point increase in the probability of supporting the export tax. Furthermore, for legislators belonging to the FVP, a 1 standard deviation increase in manufacturing share of production increases the probability of voting for the export tax by 11.9 percentage points. For legislators from the opposition, the change in the predicted probability of voting for the export tax is 8.3

FIGURE 9
Probability of Voting for the Export Tax by Manufacturing Output



Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals from estimates in Model 1 in Table 4

percentage points higher; both changes are statistically significant beyond conventional levels.

Service-sector output is associated with a higher probability of supporting higher export taxes; these results are a reflection of the concentration of economic activity around urban centers, which benefit from lowering agricultural prices. In Model 2, we replace manufacturing share of output with agricultural share of output: higher agriculture output lowers support for the export tax bill. Figure 10 reproduces the predicted probabilities of a legislator voting for the export tax as agricultural production increases, in line with our expectations.

In Models 3–4, we replace output with regional employment in agriculture, industry, and services. In all cases, as we are dealing with proportions, we exclude one sector at a time. As expected, a higher share of manufacturing employment in the electoral district is associated with a higher probability of voting for the export tax (Model 3); a higher share of agriculture employment, on the

FIGURE 10
Probability of Voting for the Export Tax by Agricultural Output



Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals from estimates in Model 2 in Table 4

other hand, is associated with a lower likelihood of voting for the bill (Model 4). The marginal impact of service employment on the probability of voting for the export tax bill is similar to that of manufacturing employment (Model 4).

As can be observed from these models, sectoral output and employment within districts affect legislative behavior even when controlling for party and district magnitude, which according to received wisdom should minimize local constituency influence over individual legislators. It is also worth noting that controlling for sectoral output, employment, partisan and institutional incentives, public employment, and soy production in the district remain important predictors of legislators' behavior and are not muted by institutional incentives, in line with our predictions about the influence of local interests and voters.

Placebo Test

One potential challenge to our identification strategy is that geographic patterns of production and representation are not randomly distributed; they could be driven by unobserved confounders, rather than reflecting the distributive effects of the export tax bill. To address these concerns, we run our model using an alternative dependent variable as a placebo test. This dependent variable is the roll-call vote on a bill nationalizing private-sector pension funds (AFJP), which was introduced in November 2008 and voted on a month later by the same Congress that rejected the export tax bill. This bill reversed a prior statute from 1993 which privatized social security and was extremely salient given its almost universal coverage.

Figure A2.8 in Appendix A2 illustrates the saliency of this issue by graphing the frequency of articles mentioning pensions ("jubilaciones") and pension funds ("AFJP") in the same Congressional daily "El Parlamentario." The plots suggest that interest in pension reform increased before the Parliamentary treatment of the nationalization bill. Importantly, the distributive effects of pension funds' nationalization have a different geographic distribution than those of the export tax bill or the distribution of soybean production. Thus, while we expect partisan motivations to be a significant explanatory variable for voting for both bills, we anticipate no association with the variables "soy planted" or import-competition and support for pension funds' nationalization.

Table 5 reports results from this placebo test. They show that party is positively associated with the probability of voting for the nationalization of pension funds: legislators aligned with the government overwhelmingly supported the bill, and members of the opposition voted against it. Yet we find no association between the probability of voting for this bill and the import-competing dummy or the measure of soy planted in the district, which is consistent with our expectations.

Figure 11 graphs the probability of voting in favor of the AFJP bill as a function of soy planted in the legislators' district of residence [Figure 11(a) and (b)]. This null result confirms our expectations: the distributive consequences of the pension bill did not cut across regions classified in terms of the expected distributional consequences of trade.

FIGURE 11
Probability of Voting for Nationalization of Pension Funds (a) All Legislators, by soy production in district of residence. (b) By party and soy production in district of residence



Note: Predicted probabilities and 95% Confidence Intervals of Voting Yes on Nationalization of Pension Funds (AFJP) based on estimates from Table 5

Implications for Legislators' Careers

Our results suggest that legislators' votes on the export tax bill are associated with the expected impact of the bill at the local level. For opposition legislators, these incentives aligned with those of their parties but pitted legislators in the government coalition against their party's line. The Legislative Record reflects that defectors voiced concerns about those cross-cutting incentives in their legislative speeches (see Table A3.4 in Appendix A3).

Furthermore, defectors seemed to have paid a cost for defying their party leaders.[19] Indeed, 14 of the 19 defectors from the incumbent FPV were not reelected in 2009; the five who were reelected did not run on the FPV list: four were slated under the Federal Peronist list and one under the UCR. The cost was lower for allied legislators, especially the former Radicales-K, as half were reelected, and the other half shifted to provincial careers. Yet catering to local interests was instrumental in boosting their political careers in their provinces, in line with expectations derived from multilevel ambition incentives (see Tables A3.2 [for the FPV] and A3.3 [for allies] in Appendix A3).

The electoral value of catering to local interests was highlighted in the results of the 2009 midterm election, where the impact of the conflict over the 2008 export tax seemed to have eroded the support for the FPV. The negative impact was particularly strong in the province of Buenos Aires, where 40% of voters live, and where former President Nestor Kirchner himself led the FPV list. Indeed, "soy planted" has a strong negative effect on change in the vote for the FPV list in the province of Buenos Aires at the department level relative to the 2007 election—even when controlling for the lockouts, the party of the mayor, and the proportion of FPV votes in the prior midterm election of 2005 (Table A4.1, Appendix A4).[20]

In sum, our evidence suggests that when facing a salient vote in Congress, legislators tend to cater to local losers from the policy, to the point where some are willing to vote against their parties. Whereas this local connection could reflect the influence of organized interest or voters, we showed evidence in support of the latter channel.

Conclusion

Our argument and evidence show that trade policymaking in contexts of high saliency generates incentives for legislators' responsiveness to local constituencies even under closed-list PR electoral systems with party control over access to the list. In Argentina, where the distributive effects of trade are heterogeneous across constituencies within the same electoral district, we interpret the attention of legislators to local voters as a strategic move aimed at fostering their political careers, which have a strong territorial component and are not limited to returning to the National Congress.

We underscore two important implications derived from our findings. First, while prior work emphasizes the impact of electoral institutions on partisan discipline in legislatures, using survey experiments and analyses of legislative behavior, we identify an alternative mechanism for legislators to pursue their political ambition. By focusing on legislators' incentives within a PR electoral system, we identify the conditions that make them more responsive to their local constituencies, and even willing to defy party leaders who determine access to the ballot. Our results have important implications for understanding the impact of political ambition on policy outcomes in ways that cannot be easily explained by cross-national comparisons of electoral regimes. We expect future research to extend the research of legislators' incentives within PR electoral systems to other policy areas with varying issue salience.

Second, we show that when trade is salient, legislators respond and behave in a way that suggests they internationalize the distributive impact of trade on crucial constituents. Our findings on legislators' preferences and behavior resonate with recent work showing that salience brings to the fore concerns about material consequences of trade (Rho and Tomz 2017) as well as legislators' responsiveness (Guisinger 2017). They are also in line with recent findings that voters are more informed than previously thought about trade policy and more likely to exert influence over legislators' behavior and policy choices (Butler and Nickerson 2011; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). These patterns are especially relevant as trade policy has become more salient in the public discourse not only in the Global North, but also in the Global South.

Data Availability Statement

Data and replication materials: all data and replication materials are available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RXONLT.

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NOTES

1. On legislators' behavior, see Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast (1997), McGillivray (2004), Schonhardt-Bailey (2006), Guisinger (2017), Rickard (2018). On individual trade preferences, see Rogowski (1989), Hiscox (2002); Rodrik (1995); O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda and Rodrik (2005), Mansfield and Mutz (2009), Ardanaz, Murillo, and Pinto (2013), and Rho and Tomz (2017).

2. Information about the distributive consequences of trade raises the prominence of self-regarding material concerns among individual voters (Rho and Tomz 2017), whereas policy salience increases incentives for legislative responsiveness (Carey 2009; Guisinger 2017; Shapiro 2011).

3. Analítica Consultora: http://bit.ly/1HIIqnO (accessed November 7, 2011).

4. Between 2007 and 2011, agricultural producers' net transfers to the Treasury accounted for 45% of their annual soybean production (O'Farrell and Freytes 2017, 184).

5. Legislators from the ruling coalition were slightly underrepresented: 50.58% of House Members belonged to the FPV caucus, against 45.5% in our survey. On every other relevant dimension, the sample is representative of the floor.

6. Using identical questions and frames, in a 2007 survey of Argentine voters 78.5% supported trade in the control group (Ardanaz, Murillo, and Pinto 2013).

7. We include "No response" as respondents often choose this option when they are confused with the frame. Under the price frame "strongly agree" responses drop to 73% (Figure A.2.1 in the appendix).

8. Hafner-Burton et al. (2014) and Tomz (2009) also find weaker effects among elites than the public.

9. Contrasting these differences with those for electoral district magnitude, which shows no differences in framing effects, underscores the differences between local and district-wide incentives.

10. Statistical analyses are granted because groups are not balanced on party, soy planted, and legislative vote for the export tax bill (Table A2.1 in Appendix 2). Results remain substantively and statistically the same when using linear probability, multinomial or ordered models.

11. Membership in the ruling FPV party, the import-competing dummy, and vote for the export tax are negative; education returns a positive; yet none of these estimates attain statistical significance. Political ideology or voting for the export tax bill are positively associated with strongly supporting trade (models 1–3, 7–8 in Table 1). Note that all respondents in the control group express strong support for trade, including legislators who voted in favor of the export tax. These findings suggest that due to selection into party lists, the export tax vote does not independently affect attitudes once region and party are accounted for. Importantly, we find strong heterogeneous framing effects across regions, even when including these variables as controls, suggesting that revealed preferences reflect local constituency links.

12. The standard error of the substantive effect differs from the standard error of the coefficient of the interactive component and cannot be interpreted from the *z-value* on the individual coefficients. For substantively relevant values of the variables of interest, the marginal effect of the interactive effect could be significant even if the individual parameters are not (see Brambor et al. 2006; Greene 2003, 123–24). This is particularly the case in models with limited dependent variables.

13. The price frame, by contrast, has a similar substantive effect in both regions; there are no regional differences in the level of support for trade in the control group (see Figures A.2.5–A.2.7 in Appendix 2).

14. The president of the Lower Chamber did not vote because there was no tie. Two representatives abstained (one from the government bloc and one from an allied bloc) and three were absent (two aligned with the government and one with the opposition). The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of these representatives, who were classified voting "no" in the models reported.

15. http://bit.ly/1GXuLOS (accessed January 17, 2013).

16. Using legislative caucus membership yields identical results.

17. The effect of "soy planted" becomes stronger when adding the import-competing dummy (Models 3–7).

18. Ideology is derived from ideal point estimates using legislators' responses to questions about their self-placement on the left-right spectrum and placement of other relevant political actors; higher values reflect more conservative/right-leaning ideology.

19. Members of the government coalition who voted against the export tax were split on their support for pension nationalization vote. This suggests that the

vote on the trade tax is more likely to be a signal to local constituents rather than a clean break with their party.

20. Porto and Lodola (2013) and Mangonnet, Murillo, and Rubio (2018) document similar patterns at the municipal and the national levels respectively.

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Appendix A1

TABLE A1
Sectoral Output and Employment by Province/Electoral District

Province		Output (%)			Employment (%)		
(electoral district)	Population	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Pcia. de Buenos Aires	14,917,940	4.41	28.82	66.58	4.67	27.35	67.66
Ciudad de Buenos Aires	3,034,161	0.33	10.52	88.03	0.56	14.92	84.12
Catamarca	380,612	1.97	5.09	32.21	16.27	22.31	55.61
Chaco	1,042,881	13.46	7.04	79.24	15.55	12.11	72.18
Chubut	455,607	1.90	10.90	66.56	11.34	12.46	67.95
Cordoba	3,311,280	13.48	15.43	70.81	6.91	20.68	71.97
Corrientes	1,002,416	9.57	13.60	76.27	20.12	15.14	64.54
Entre Rios	1,242,547	15.48	10.97	73.47	17.98	18.91	62.71
Formosa	532,238	13.40	5.81	78.97	8.41	7.99	83.17
Jujuy	670,766	7.85	0.76	75.86	17.15	24.22	55.25
La Pampa	329,576	21.53	4.41	71.26	16.67	11.59	70.44
La Rioja	334,235	4.12	13.07	82.70	14.36	34.75	50.46
Mendoza	1,711,416	9.60	15.58	60.54	11.35	20.16	66.48
Misiones	1,061,590	8.15	15.22	71.61	12.60	22.91	64.29
Neuquén	538,952	1.13	5.71	43.05	5.66	8.01	75.48
Rio Negro	594,189	6.33	6.60	81.81	20.72	9.50	67.81
Salta	1,202,753	14.88	7.91	70.92	19.15	13.03	65.75
San Juan	685,883	11.03	15.75	72.48	14.43	20.41	61.77
San Luis	428,025	7.48	35.25	56.75	5.56	36.44	57.24

(continued)

TABLE A1
(Continued)

Province		Output (%)			Employment (%)		
(electoral district)	Population	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Santa Cruz	221,871	0.65	3.63	60.80	12.65	6.09	68.58
Santa Fe	3,220,818	11.03	17.07	71.85	5.77	27.35	66.77
Santiago del Estero	856,739	21.16	7.21	71.23	10.47	9.78	79.33
Tierra del Fuego	122,531	0.63	28.41	50.53	4.98	27.45	63.91
Tucuman	1,457,357	9.92	18.16	70.13	15.64	16.70	67.39

Appendix A2

TABLE A2
Sectoral Output by Region for Largest Electoral Districts

			Output (%)		
Province	Regions	Population	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Buenos Aires	*All Regions*	14,917,940	4.41	28.82	66.58
Buenos Aires	*Seccion 1*	4,817,460	0.07	45.85	54.05
Buenos Aires	*Seccion 2*	630,677	19.17	19.99	60.81
Buenos Aires	*Seccion 3*	4,826,529	0.59	37.12	62.24
Buenos Aires	*Seccion 4*	565,279	37.39	12.05	50.57
Buenos Aires	*Seccion 5*	807,496	11.71	16.77	69.94
Buenos Aires	*Seccion 6*	668,752	25.53	16.04	58.34
Buenos Aires	*Seccion 7*	287,662	45.11	38.70	14.14
Buenos Aires	*Seccion 8*	574,369	1.82	20.78	77.39
Cordoba	*All Regions*	3,311,280	13.48	15.43	70.81
Cordoba	*Ciudad de Cordoba*	1,284,582	0.54	46.33	52.78
Cordoba	*San Francisco*	190,182	38.45	48.50	13.05
Cordoba	*Gran Cordoba*	171,067	35.00	32.75	31.76
Santa Fe	*All Regions*	220,818	11.03	17.07	71.85
Santa Fe	*Ciudad de Santa Fe*	489,505	7.18	38.88	53.85
Santa Fe	*Rosario*	*1,121,441*	*2.25*	*69.37*	*28.35*

Sources of Data for Soybean Planted

The data on soy production are from http://old.siia.gov.ar/index.php/series-por-tema/agricultura (accessed February 6, 2014). The original soy data were modified for two provinces. In Entre Rios, the department of Islas del Ibicuy was missing soy-production data; we used the averages of neighboring Gualeguay and Gualeguaychu to substitute for these data. In Buenos Aires, Pila (02088) and General Guido (02043) received the averages of their neighbors Rauch (02094), Ayacucho (02005), Maipú (02073), Dolores (02033), Castelli (02023), Chascomús (02030), General Belgrano (02042), and Las Flores (02065) to impute for missing data.

Sources of Data for Legislative Caucus

Ernesto Calvo and Marcelo Escolar "Las Tres Reformas: personalizacion, eficiencia y gobernabilidad. Geografia polıtica de la reforma electoral en Argentina," *Polıtica y Gestion*. Vol. 2, Num 5. UNSAM. Agosto 2003.

TABLE A2.1
Distribution of covariates—Treatment and Control Groups

	Control	Treatment	Difference	t-stat
College and above	0.764	0.703	0.061	0.92
	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.066)	
Import-competing region	0.375	0.383	−0.008	−0.11
	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.072)	
District magnitude	25.958	28.008	−2.049	−0.52
	(2.996)	(2.400)	(3.910)	
Vote for export tax	0.375	0.508	−0.133	−1.81
	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.073)	
FPV caucus	0.361	0.507	−0.148	−2.01
	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.073)	
Soy planted in district	0.114	0.081	0.033	2.39
	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.014)	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A2.2
Roll-Call Vote on Export Tax Bill—Nonlinear Effects

	DV: Vote on Export Taxes (Res. 125)	
	(1)	(2)
FPV	2.232***	2.414***
	(0.208)	(0.285)
Soy Planted	−3.015***	−1.948
	(1.167)	(1.559)
FPV × Soy Planted		−1.927
		(2.037)
Import-competing Region	0.096	0.116
	(0.247)	(0.242)
Pub. Employment	0.007	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Dist. Magnitude	0.006	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	−1.354***	−1.432***
	(0.353)	(0.378)
pseudo-R^2	0.445	0.447
N	257	257

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. DV: Vote on Export Tax Bill (Res. 125).
***$p < 0.01$.

FIGURE A2.1
Support for Increasing Trade by Frame



FIGURE A2.2
Support for Increasing Trade by Frame and Education



FIGURE A2.3
Support for Increasing Trade by Frame and Party



FIGURE A2.4
Support for Increasing Trade by Frame and Region



FIGURE A2.5
Probability of Responding "Strongly Agree" by frame and region



Note. Predicted probabilities and 90% confidence intervals of responding "Strongly Agree" derived from Model 4 in Table 1.

FIGURE A2.6
Differences in Framing Effects by Region



FIGURE A2.7
Probability of Voting for the Export Tax—Nonlinear Models



Note: Predicted probabilities and 90% Confidence Intervals of Voting "Yes" on Ratification of Export Tax (Res. 125/08), derived from estimates in Model 2 in Table 4.

FIGURE A2.8
Articles on Pensions ("jubilaciones") or pension funds ("AFJP") in El Parlamentario



TABLE A3.1
List of Progovernment Representatives Voting Against Export Tax Bill

Last Name	First Name	Electoral District	Caucus	Vote on 125	Category	Party List
Albarracín	Jorge Luis	Mendoza	De la Concertacion	NEGATIVE	Radical K	De la Concertacion
Baladrón	Manuel Justo	La Pampa	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Barrionuevo	José Luis	Catamarca	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Camaño	Graciela	Buenos Aires	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Collantes	Genaro Aurelio	Catamarca	Frente Civico y Social	NEGATIVE	Radical K	Frente Civico y Social
Cremer de Busti	María Cristina	Entre Ríos	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Daher	Zulema Beatriz	Salta	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Diez	María Inés	Salta	Renovador de Salta	NEGATIVE	FPV Allies	Renovador de Salta
García	Irma Adriana	La Pampa	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Halak	Beatriz Susana	Córdoba	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Heredia	Arturo Miguel	Córdoba	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Katz Jora	Víctor Daniel	Buenos Aires	De la Concertacion	NEGATIVE	Radical K	De la Concertacion
López Arias	Marcelo Eduardo	Salta	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	ABSENT	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Montero	Laura Gisela	Mendoza	De la Concertacion	NEGATIVE	Radical K	De la Concertacion

(Continues)

TABLE A3.1
(Continued)

Last Name	First Name	Electoral District	Caucus	Vote on 125	Category	Party List
Montoya	Jorge Luciano	Córdoba	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Oliva	Cristian Rodolfo	Santiago del Estero	Frente Civico por Santiago	NEGATIVE	Radical K	Frente Civico por Santiago
Osorio	Marta Lucía	La Pampa	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	ABSTENTION	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Paroli	Raúl Omar	Catamarca	Frente Civico y Social	NEGATIVE	Radical K	Frente Civico y Social
Pastoriza	Eduardo Antonio	Catamarca	Por la Verdad	NEGATIVE	FPV Allies	Por la Verdad
Petit	María de los Ángeles	Entre Ríos	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Rivas	Jorge	Buenos Aires	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	ABSENT	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Scalesi	Juan Carlos	Río Negro	De la Concertacion	NEGATIVE	Radical K	De la Concertacion
Solá	Felipe Carlos	Buenos Aires	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Thomas	Enrique Luis	Mendoza	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Torfe	Mónica Liliana	Salta	Renovador de Salta	NEGATIVE	FPV Allies	Renovador de Salta
Velarde	Marta Sylvia	Santiago del Estero	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Villaverde	Jorge Antonio	Buenos Aires	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ
Zavallo	Gustavo Marcelo	Entre Ríos	Frente para la Victoria-PJ	NEGATIVE	FPV	Frente para la Victoria-PJ

TABLE A3.2
Trajectories of FPV Defectors

Name	Party	District	Career pre 2008	Career post 2008
Baladron, Martin	FPV	La Pampa	Vice governor (3 times), mayor, national representative.	Not reelected but career in the executive.
Barrionuevo, Jose	FPV	Catamarca	National Senator, union leader.	Not reelected, joins opposition PJ.
Caamaño, Graciela	FPV	Buenos Aires	FPV National representative	Reelected under opposition PJ Federal list in 2011 & 2013.
Cremer de Busti, Maria	FPV	Entre Rios	National Representative (wife of governor)	2009 Reelected under coalition of FPV & opposition PJ Federal in Entre Rios & under PJ Federal list in 2013.
Daher, Zulma	FPV	Salta	National representative PJ	Changes caucus to opposition PJ Federal, but not reelected; provincial career.
Garcia, Irma	FPV	La Pampa	National representative	Not reelected.
Halak, Beatriz	FPV	Cordoba	National Senator & representative	Not reelected.
Heredia, Arturo	FPV	Córdoba	National legislator	Provincial executive officer.
Ledesma, Julio	FPV	Buenos Aires	Kirchner operator in BA, national representative	Reelected under opposition PJ Federal list in 2009 & 2013.
Montoya, Jorge	FPV	Cordoba	Undersecretary in the 1990s, National representative, Provincial Minister and officer in 2000s.	Not reelected, shifts to opposition PJ, provincial politics.
Pastoriza, Eduardo	FPV	Catamarca	National representative	Not reelected, shift to opposition PJ, provincial politics.
Petit, Maria de los Angeles	FPV	Entre Rios	Provincial legislator, Executive & municipal officer & senator, national representative.	Not reelected in 2009, shift to opposition PJ, provincial politics.

(Continues)

TABLE A3.2
(Continued)

Name	Party	District	Career pre 2008	Career post 2008
Sola, Felipe	FPV	Buenos Aires	Secretary of Agriculture in the 1990s, vice-governor, national representative.	Reelected in under opposition PJ Federal list in 2009 & 2013.
Thomas, Enrique	FPV	Mendoza	National representative	Reelected in 2009 under UCR list.
Torfe, Monica	FPV	Salta	National representative	Not reelected, provincial politics.
Velarde, Marta	FPV	Santiago del Estero	National representative, constitutional convention.	Not reelected.
Villaverde, Jorge	FPV	Buenos Aires	Mayor, Senator, constitutional convention, National representative.	Not reelected, Provincial representative & senator after 2009.
Zavallo, Gustavo	FPV	Entre Rios	Provincial administration, national representative.	Not reelected, shift to opposition PJ Federal, provincial representative.

TABLE A3.3
Trajectories of Defectors from Parties Allied to the FPV

Name	Party	District	Career pre 2008	Career post 2008
Albarracin, Jorge	UCR	Mendoza	Provincial executive officer, alternate for national representative.	Reelected as alternate in 2009, provincial representative.
Collantes, Genaro	UCR	Catamarca	National representative UCR	Reelected under UCR list in 2009; dies before swearing in.
Diez, Maria	Alianza Frente Justicialista	Salta	National representative	Provincial administration
Katz, Victor	UCR	Buenos Aires	City councilor, mayor, national representative.	Lost re-election under UCR list in 2011; provincial career.
Montero, Laura	UCR	Mendoza	Provincial minister of Finance, National representative.	Elected as Senator for UCR.
Oliva, Cristian	UCR	Santiago del Estero	National representative	Reelected under UCR list in 2009.
Paroli, Raul	UCR	Catamarca	Provincial Secretary	Not reelected, returns to provincial bureaucracy.
Scalesi, Juan Carlos	UCR	Rio Negro	Provincial union leader, national representative.	Not reelected, provincial union leader.

Appendix A3

Table A3.4. Interventions by legislators who defected from the official party caucus and participated in the legislative debate.

We selected the passages that highlight tensions between partisan and local loyalties to illustrate the cross-pressures these legislators were feeling and openly expressing.

The legislative debate is available at https://www.diputados.gob.ar/secparl/dtaqui/diario_sesiones/index.html

Representative Manuel Balandrón, La Pampa, Congressional Record of the 17th Session, July 4, 2008, p.225-226.

"I have to say that today is a difficult day for me as it is for many of my colleague…Firstly, i want to ask for forgiveness from my caucus colleagues because i will not vote like them in this law. Everyone who knows me, knows that over many years as representative in the National Congress—I am in my third term—I have always supported the initiatives of my caucus and my government…Yet, as a national representative for the province of La Pampa, my priority and inexcusable obligation is to represent for the interest and welfare of my provincial constituents…The bill we are discussing is damaging to the interest of the province of La Pampa… [La Pampa] is an agrarian province. We do not have manufacture, nor oil, or mines…The main motor of economic activity in the province is the agrarian sector in all its diversity…I have no personal interest, I do not have any land myself and had never been involved in agrarian activities…I am defending the interest of all the towns in La Pampa that do well when rural activities do well."

Representative Genaro Collantes, Catamarca, Congressional Record of the 17th Session, July 4, 2008, p.248-9

"After a long time, the small farmers who had spent a terrible period were beginning to see how their future and that of their land was improving, they were growing again. A new phenomenon called 'ruralization' by agrarian leaders emerged as the small towns of the hinterland were growing thank to the economic development generated by agrarian production. We were seeing even the migration of families towards the agrarian areas and small towns seeking a better future… the agrarian production of small and medium farmers has a multiplying effect that is crucial as it

happens in my province. Therefore, to give incentives to this sector is very important…It is necessary as well that the revenue from taxes on productions that are from the provinces comes back to the provinces…why is that revenue from export taxes is not shared with the provinces?

Representative Maria Cristina Cremer de Busti, Entre Rios, Congressional Record of the 17th Session, July 4, 2008, p.251

"I disagree with the application of the new rates established in the bill introduced by the executive—with all their modifications—because they have a damaging effect on profitability, which will be severe to the point of drowning small and medium farmers, especially in Entre Rios. [In Entre Rios], the majority of [small and medium farmers] are young families who do not want to migrate to the large cities, but instead want that their towns grow thank to the economic development brought by agrarian activities…like a Peronist with a federal perspective, who cares about the provinces of the hinterland, and especially [my own province] Entre Rios, and for all who trust me is that I cannot support the bill introduced by the executive…"

Representative Zulma Daher, Salta, Congressional Record of the 17th Session, July 4, 2008, p.253

"I have always been loyal and supported every one of the bills sent by the executive to this Chamber because I considered that each of them reflected the interest of all Argentine citizens. However, this time I cannot accompany with my vote the majority opinion because it does not reflect the interest of the citizens of Salta, whom I promise to defend when they chose me as national representative for the province of Salta…To share between the provinces and the federal government what is collected by export taxes, either by including it in the revenue share system through the creation of specific funds [is crucial].

Representative Beatriz Halak, Cordoba, Congressional Record of the 17th Session, July 4, 2008, p.306

"It is not a clash with this administration because we aspire to its success and we have always support it from our seat in the Lower Chamber and we will always defend it from any attempt to disturb

its legitimate right to govern…Along with the representatives from Cordoba, Montoya, Heredia and myself, and in agreement with our public statements since the onset of the conflict [with farmers], for our governor, our provincial legislature, and almost all mayors in the province, as well as three representatives for Entre Rios, Cremer de Busti, Zaballo and Petit, we inform the executive power of our disagreement. Instead of the current bill, we propose an alternative one…in the discussions and seeking to reach consensus we agree with various representatives from diverse province whose visible leader is representative Felipe Sola from the province of Buenos Aires, that our alternative bill would achieve the proposed objectives and replace the resolution 125 [whose letter was the executive bill] while granting to Congress attributions on this area [export taxes]…"

Representative Arturo Heredia, Cordoba, Congressional Record of the 17th Session, July 4, 2008, p.307

"I am not an opponent to the national government. I have voted for Mrs. Cristina de Kirchner and I have run her campaign along with the governor of my province who was her chief campaign manager. Fundamentally, I insist that I am opposing her but today I am faced with the need to avoid betraying my belief and those of my voters, who gave me this seat in the National Congress in representation of Union por Cordoba, the Peronist Party of Cordoba and all the citizens of Cordoba, not only those who voted for me…"

Representative Jorge Montoya, Cordoba, Congressional Record of the 17th Session, July 4, 2008, p.311

"It was a hike in export taxes that affected all the farmers, who in our country develop their productive activities in the hinterland, and even if they do not have a profit are forced to pay 44% of their total production, not of their profit without being able to subtract expenses…It was the national government that suddenly, without consultation, increase the tax rates. It was not the farmers who establish road blockades by mere whim, it was a reaction against this policy mistake…the hinterland has come to halt, with no activity, no payments, the agrarian manufactures suspending workers, everyone is angry and uncertain about the future…the interior of our

motherland has come to a halt, but it is alive. We should let it live for Argentina to be prosperous and to have a better future."

Representative Gustavo Zavallo, Entre Rios, Congressional Record of the 17th Session, July 4, 2008, p.344

"All this time i have reaffirmed my loyalty to the Peronist Party, my commitment with the Peronism of Entre Rios and with all those who voted for me…I come from a small town in the department of Parana, in the province of Entre Rios, called Viale, with approximately 15,000 inhabitants. All those from Viale, like almost everyone from Entre Rios, have witness the historical economic recovery that Argentina experience in the last few years… I support the national government, but I disagree with regards to this agrarian policy that seriously hurt this productive sector… In our province, we have felt like in no other province, the discontent of the agrarian sector because Entre Rios has less fertile soil than the rest of the provinces of the Pampas. Its soil requires more fertilizers and agrochemicals than others and this bill attacks our production and profitability."

Appendix A4

TABLE A4.1
Change in Vote for FPV (Buenos Aires Province, 2009–2007)

DV: Δ ***FPV Vote***$_{2009–2007}$	(1)	(2)
Allied Mayor	1.270	0.271
	(1.559)	(1.659)
Number of Lockouts	−0.582	−0.508
	(0.375)	(0.375)
Soy Production (10,000)	−0.726***	−0.734***
	(0.193)	(0.192)
FPV Vote 2005 (%)		0.124*
		(0.074)
Constant	−18.450***	−22.935***
	(1.653)	(3.137)
N	134	134
Adjusted R^2	0.134	0.146

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent Variable = FPV $Vote_{2009}$ – FPV $Vote_{200}$.

*$p < 0.10$.

***$p < 0.01$.

Appendix B AGGREGATE AND DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF TRADE

Preferences for a more open or closed trade regime can be derived from the effect of trade policy on a household's indirect utility, which we can characterize as a function of a vector of income and prices: $V = f(I_i\ (p))$, where I_i is individual i's income, and p is a vector of prices. The net impact depends on an economic actor's position in the economy which determines whether the change in relative prices results in higher real income. Note that income also has a market component (y_i) and a fiscal component (g_i), the individual's share of government output—namely the net of the government transfers received minus the taxes paid.

Three strands of economic theory suggest that support for free trade is a function of the expected effects of trade on: (1) the return to the factors of production as proposed by the Hecksher-Ohlin model (and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem); (2) the return to the assets owned by the respondent as derived from the specific factors model (or Ricardo-Viner); (3) the skill premium resulting from the relative demand for skill by exporting firms in the new–new trade theory (Melitz-type) models. As discussed below, the distributional consequences of trade vary across these models.

To derive trade-policy preferences of local voters and interests, we need to identify the expected direct and indirect distributional consequences of trade. Irrespective of the underlying economic model of trade, the impact of trade on an individual household depends on the household's sources of income and employment net of taxes and transfers and on the prices of the goods they consume. Economic theory suggests that trade policy directly affects the relative prices of tradable goods and indirectly affects prices of nontradable services. The change in relative prices of imports and exports effected by trade, results in changes in the quantities of goods produced and consumed, affecting the return and real income of different economic actors. Changing prices result in higher output in the sectors which experience a rise in their relative prices, boosting employment and profits, and depresses economic activity in the sectors whose relative prices go down (Rodrik 1995, 1460–63).

Trade also affects, albeit indirectly, the income and consumption in the nontradable sector, which in most countries is the largest

source of employment and economic activity. Prices of nontradable services adjust to the expansion and contraction of trade, affecting labor and business income and consumption even for individuals who are not directly engaged in exporting or import competing industries (Rodrik 1995). In the aggregate, there is a positive income-channel effect of trade openness on nontradable activities, resulting from higher demand for services from industries catering to the sectors that expand due to the change in relative prices. Trade also has an effect on household's well-being through a consumption channel. This consumption effect depends on the relative composition of the basket of goods consumed by the household: in a country that is a net exporter of food, for instance, trade openness negatively affects households in the service sector who consume but do not produce food.

Which actors and industries in the nontradable sector benefit or hurt from openness and protectionism depend on the underlying model of trade: if factors are mobile across industries, those used more intensively in producing the good that expands would see a real income benefit; those factors used more intensively in producing the good whose output contracts as trade expands are more likely to hurt (Stolper-Samuelson). If, on the other hand, factors are less mobile across sectors, the net impact depends on whether the economic actor is employed in the exporting or the import-competing industry; for the factor that can move across industries, the net effect of trade depends on composition of the actor's consumption basket (Ricardo-Viner effect). In the Melitz framework, factors providing services that cater to more productive firms are likely to benefit.

In the Argentine case, we would expect differential geographical impact of trade openness on service-sector actors resulting from the income and consumption channels, as a result of low mobility across regions: income effects are likely to be positive for nontradable activities in areas serving agricultural production and negative effect for services in areas dominated by import-competing industries (Porto 2006; Porto and Lodola 2013).